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ABSTRACT
HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE INNER CITY
Dionissi Aliprantis
Kenneth I. Wolpin
There is a large divide in the education, labor market, and personal security outcomes
of black and white young males in the United States. This paper develops and
estimates a dynamic model of black young males’ joint decisions about schooling,
labor force participation, and personal security. The formulation of the model is
inspired by Elijah Anderson’s ethnographic research regarding the incentives black
young males face to ensure their personal security in environments where it is not
provided by state institutions. I operationalize Anderson’s notion of the code of the
street by defining the set of skills and knowledge useful for providing personal security
to be a distinct type of human capital, street capital, that agents may accumulate in
my model. The model is estimated using longitudinal data from the NLSY97, which
includes unusually rich information on participation in street behaviors. I use the
model to quantify the influence of the code of the street on black males’ schooling
and labor market choices, and I examine potential policies to influence such choices.
In particular, the estimated model is used to simulate a world in which children grow
up in safe neighborhoods, as well as a world in which agents are given an unforeseen
opportunity to freely dispose of their stocks of street capital. Under both simulations
there is a dramatic rise in the share of African American males who graduate from
high school and participate in the labor market. Counterfactual experiments are also
performed to test the effects of wage and education subsidies. The large effects of
the code of the street indicate that interpersonal violence is an empirically important
factor influencing the education and labor market outcomes of black young men.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over forty years have passed since the Civil Rights Act, and yet there remains a
large racial divide in the education and labor market outcomes of young men in the
United States. 37% of black males in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997
(NLSY97) do not earn a high school diploma or better by age 21, in comparison with
only 20% of white males. Black males are much less likely to work than white males,
and overall they work far fewer hours.1 As shown in Figure 1, the hours worked by
black high school dropouts are especially low. Considering such outcomes together,
Table 1 shows that after the age of 15 the percentage of black males who are neither
in school nor in the labor force tends to be at least double that of white males.
Racial disparities also persist with respect to exposure to violence and interaction
with the criminal justice system. Table 2 presents evidence that black males in the
NLSY97 are much more likely to have seen someone shot at than white males, also
tend to hear more gunshots in their neighborhoods, and are less likely to report feeling
safe at school. The homicide death rate of black males between 15-34 is approximately
8 times that of white males (NCHS (2009)). Figure 2 shows that black males are much
1For example, 21% of black males in the NLSY97 are not working at age 23, in comparison with
6% of white males. Moreover, the median 23 year old black male works 24 hours per week, compared
with 38 hours per week for whites.
1
more likely than their white counterparts to have been suspended from school, and
Pettit and Western (2004) estimate that for black (white) males aged 30-34 in 1999,
nearly 59% (11%) of high school dropouts had spent time in prison.
A large literature in economics aims to understand the reasons for these dispari-
ties. Most of this literature focuses on education and labor market outcomes without
considering non-market behavior. Key findings from this literature are that early skill
differences are able to explain a large share of subsequent educational attainment and
earnings gaps (Neal and Johnson (1996)), and that school quality has important im-
plications for education and labor market outcomes (Card and Krueger (1992)).2
A smaller and mainly theoretical literature in economics abstracts from related
labor market incentives and uses ideas from sociology to help formulate models of
how non-market factors influence choices. One example is Silverman (2004), which
develops a game theoretic framework in which there is a pay-off to investing in a
violent reputation. His model is inspired by Elijah Anderson’s ethnographic research
on the “code of the street,” an implicit code of conduct that has emerged in many poor
African American neighborhoods due to the absence of institutions providing personal
security. Alternatively, Akerlof and Kranton (2002) and Austen-Smith and Fryer
(2005) develop peer-influence models where utility from choices depends directly on
peer group behavior. Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) models a phenomenon described
in the ethnography of Fordham and Ogbu (1986), where working hard in school is
considered “acting white,” and thus African American children may be ostracized
from their peer group for educational attainment. A key feature of these models is
the possibility of equilibria characterized by adverse outcomes, such as low educational
attainment or high levels of violent behavior.
2Additional important work in this literature includes Keane and Wolpin (2000), Cameron and
Heckman (2001), Carneiro et al. (2005), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), Darity and Mason
(1998), Bowlus and Eckstein (2002), Eckstein and Wolpin (1999a), Keane and Wolpin (1997), Hahn
et al. (1999), Rivkin et al. (2005), Hanushek and Rivkin (2006), Donohue and Heckman (1991),
Arcidiacono (2005), and Urzúa (2008).
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Despite their plausibility, it has proven difficult to assess the empirical relevance
of these newer theories, in part because they relate to non-pecuniary rewards and
behaviors that are not usually directly observed. In particular, it has proven difficult
to understand how non-pecuniary rewards vary geographically or socially, as well as
their relationship with more standard pecuniary factors. For example, the empirical
evidence is unclear regarding the existence of “acting white,” let alone the magnitude
of its effects (Fryer and Torelli (2005), Cook and Ludwig (1997), Ainsworth-Darnell
and Downey (1998)). In addition, empirical results from the recent Moving To Op-
portunity (MTO) housing mobility experiment, such as negative effects of mobility on
young males (Kling et al. (2007)) and no effects on achievement tests (Sanbonmatsu
et al. (2006)), only seem to raise further questions about many neighborhood effects
as first postulated by Wilson (1987).3 These difficulties point to the importance of
considering pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors together when modeling individuals’
joint decision-making about education, work, and violent behavior.
This paper develops and estimates a dynamic discrete choice model of young
black males’ decisions regarding schooling, labor market participation, and street
behavior that incorporates both pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards. In specifying
the model, I draw on Elijah Anderson’s ethnographic evidence that many young
black males face incentives to engage in violent behavior. According to Anderson
(1999), weak institutions and labor market conditions have left a void in setting and
maintaining the social order within poor African American neighborhoods, allowing a
“street” element to fill this void with its own code of conduct. This code of conduct,
known as the code of the street, encourages individuals to use violence to further
their own interests. Anderson has observed that those who become very invested in
this code of conduct tend to become alienated from mainstream institutions, such as
3The Moving To Opportunity (MTO) experiment randomly allocated housing vouchers to fam-
ilies living in poor neighborhoods in five US cities.
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the formal labor market.4
To empirically operationalize Anderson’s concept of the code of the street and its
influences on the choices of young black males, I introduce into my model a distinct
type of human capital defined as street capital. In each period, agents decide whether
to attend school, work, and engage in street behaviors, and accumulate both regular
human capital and street capital through these decisions. According to the ethno-
graphic evidence, particular education and labor market choices are indications of
alienation from mainstream institutions, so the model is specified with street capital
changing the non-pecuniary rewards from these choices.
The model is estimated using unique longitudinal data from the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) that include variables measuring street
behavior. Measures of violent and non-violent street behaviors are created using self-
reported data in the NLSY97 on whether respondents have attacked someone, carried
a gun, belonged to a gang, been suspended from school, sold drugs, stolen anything,
committed a property crime, or been arrested. A Simulated Maximum Likelihood
(SML) algorithm is used to estimate the model on the sample of black males in the
NLSY97.
Several counterfactual policy experiments are used to quantify the influence of the
code of the street on the education and labor market outcomes of black young males.
First, an experiment is performed to replicate aspects of the Moving To Opportunity
(MTO) experiment. By diminishing the immediate return to street behavior, this
counterfactual mimics the incentives children face while growing up in neighborhoods
with little influence of the code of the street. Under this counterfactual scenario,
about 20% more black young men after the age of 20 choose to work. In addition,
about 7% more black young men graduate from high school, and predicted incarcera-
tion rates decrease by 1% for nearly all ages. In order to understand the importance
4Here alienated means at best uninterested in, and at worst directly opposed to.
4
of street behavior between the ages of 12 and 16, an additional counterfactual ex-
periment is performed in which agents are given the choice at age 16, without prior
knowledge, to either keep their current stock of street capital or to set them to zero.
In this scenario about 7% more black males choose either to work or to attend school,
and an additional 12% choose to graduate from high school. Finally, experiments are
performed to assess the impact of a $2,000 wage subsidy or $2,000 conditional cash
transfer for attending high school. Such a wage subsidy increases the percentage of
black males working after the age of 18 by about 10%, and the conditional cash trans-
fer causes an additional 10% of black males to graduate from high school. However,
the wage subsidy also induces 5% more of black males to drop out of high school, and
these policies have little impact on street behavior or imprisonment. Together, these
results indicate the code of the street is an empirically important phenomenon when
considering the outcomes of black young men.
The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses a wide literature re-
lated to the outcomes of black young males. Chapter 3 presents a structural dynamic
discrete choice model of human capital accumulation that incorporates key features
of this reviewed literature. The sample from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1997 (NLSY97) data set and the algorithm used to estimate the model are de-
scribed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents estimation results, and Chapter 6 discusses
counterfactual experiments and their policy implications. Chapter 7 concludes.
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Chapter 2
The Code of the Street
According to the qualitative evidence presented in Anderson (1999), weak insti-
tutions and labor market conditions have left a void in setting and maintaining the
social order within poor African American neighborhoods, empowering a “street” el-
ement to fill this void with its own code of conduct. This code of conduct, known as
the code of the street, encourages individuals to use violence in order to further their
own interests. Although most people living in poor inner city neighborhoods adhere
to a “decent” set of social norms which abhors violence (Anderson (1999), p 36), they
must adjust their behavior to deal with the “street” social types who have a proclivity
towards violence and “few moral compunctions against engaging in ‘wrongdoing’ and
‘mistreating’ others” (Anderson (1990), p 68).1 This creates neighborhoods in which,
as characterized by equilibria in the overlapping generations stage game in Silverman
(2004), small proportions of street types are able to sustain high levels of violence.
Just as Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) point out for the phenomenon of “acting
white,” it is important to note that this type of security arrangement is not unique
to poor African American neighborhoods.2 Nevertheless, the manifestation of this
1“Street” and “decent” are the labels used by inner city residents themselves; for discussions of
these labels see page 35 of Anderson (1999) and Anderson (2002).
2It may in fact be viewed as a personalized version of realpolitik as defined in Kissinger (1995).
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security arrangement in inner city neighborhoods has been heavily influenced by the
alienation many blacks feel from mainstream institutions. Anderson (1999) argues
that the code of the street is actually a cultural adaptation to a profound lack of faith
in mainstream institutions, especially “in the police and the judicial system - and in
others who would champion one’s personal security” (p 34). The racial discrimination
generating this lack of faith has also helped to create a narrative of black racial identity
that venerates alienation from mainstream institutions and values.3 The role of this
narrative within the code of the street is captured in Anderson’s description of street
and decent social norms: “The culture of decency is characterized by close extended
families, low incomes but financial stability, deep religious values, a work ethic and
desire to get ahead, the value of treating people right, and a strong disapproval
of drug use, violence, and teenage pregnancy. The street represents hipness, status
based on one’s appearance, and contempt for conventional values and behavior, which
are easily discredited because of their association with whites. These behaviors can
include doing well in school, being civil to others, and speaking Standard English” (p
287).
While historical distrust has helped to create and shape street culture, it is the
social isolation discussed in Wilson (1987) that helps to sustain it. The weakness of
social and state institutions in inner city neighborhoods allows the street group to
3While a complete overview of the forms racial discrimination has taken in the US is beyond
the scope of this paper, a few examples help to illustrate their importance in generating alienation
from mainstream institutions. For example, in addition to the well known Jim Crow laws, recent
research has shown that spurious laws were widely used to re-enslave blacks between the Eman-
cipation Proclamation and World War II (Blackmon (2008)). The white fear of black education
that inspired antiliteracy laws during the Antebellum Period (Douglass (1982)) also led to violence
against blacks who sought educational instruction during Reconstruction (Williams (2007)). Al-
though many school policies of the 20th century were ostensibly race-neutral, their enaction within
a highly segregated society created separate and unequal schools (Neckerman (2007)). The well-
known Tuskegee Syphilis Study is just one of the many instances in which medical doctors have
used African Americans for dangerous, involuntary, and nontherapeutic experimentation (Washing-
ton (2006)). Government sanctioned urban renewal projects have had disastrous consequences for
African American communities (Fullilove (2001)). And most recently, the federal government’s fail-
ure in responding to Hurricane Katrina resulted in disproportionately negative consequences for the
African American citizens of New Orleans.
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dominate the public life of all children by violently punishing any children who do
not join it (See Canada (1996).). This means that for any boy, “growing up in the
’hood means learning to some degree the code of the streets, the prescriptions and
proscriptions of public behavior. He must be able to handle himself in public, and
his parents, no matter how decent they are, may strongly encourage him to learn the
rules” (Anderson (1999), p 114). One of the most important skills a youth may learn
in order to navigate public spaces is the ability to determine which set of rules to apply
to a given situation. Anderson (1999) labels this ability “to act, and certainly with
which to gauge and understand the conduct of others” (p 105), as “code switching.”
The importance of code-switching is seen in the forces pushing youth towards the
adoption of a street identity. For example, once a youth “has established himself or
made a name for himself, he has some disincentive for code-switching, for now he
has much to lose by letting the wrong people see him do so. . . . On the streets he
has respect precisely because he has opposed that wider society” (Anderson (1999), p
103). In addition to the pull of the streets, the display of street postures for defensive
purposes is often misunderstood within mainstream society. For example, due to their
their inability to distinguish decent children from street children, “teachers’ efforts to
combat the street may cause them to lump the good students with the bad, generally
viewing all who display street emblems as adversaries” (p 96). “The knowledge that
the wider system in the person of cops, teachers, and store managers downtown is
instantly ready to lump them with the street element takes a psychological toll on
boys” (p 104). This creates “a powerful incentive for young people. . . , especially for
those sitting on the cultural fence, to invest themselves in the so-called oppositional
culture, which may be confused with their ‘black identity.’ Such a resolution allows
these alienated students to campaign for respect on their own terms, in a world they
control” (pp 96–97). While the adoption of a street identity may help youth attain
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respect, given the street’s contempt for conventional society, it negatively impacts
education and formal labor market outcomes.
2.1 Relevant Theoretical Literature
2.1.1 Economics: Reputation and Identity
The theoretical literature related to Anderson (1999) focuses primarily on repu-
tation and identity. Silverman (2004) develops a model based on Anderson’s ethnog-
raphy in order to resolve the challenges data on violent and non-pecuniary crimes
present for the standard economic model of crime developed in Becker (1968). The
key feature of Silverman (2004) is the incentive to behave violently, even for those
who derive no satisfaction from violent behavior, due to the personal security afforded
by a reputation for violence. The key result from the overlapping generations stage
game is that there exist equilibria in which a low proportion of street, or violent,
types may sustain high levels of violence due to reputation effects.
Theoretical work on identity, such as Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Akerlof and
Kranton (2002), Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005), Fang and Loury (2005), Darity
et al. (2006), Bénabou and Tirole (2007), and Battu et al. (2007), includes models in
which the inclusion of identity yields quite different predictions than more “standard”
models. Much of this work is motivated by the fictive kinship theory of Fordham and
Ogbu (1986). The key feature of Akerlof and Kranton (2002) is that agents receive
direct utility from behaving near an ideal type, and this competes with the pecuniary
benefits to accumulating human capital. Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) formulate a
two-audience signalling model in which a signal that increases wages decreases peer
group acceptance. The equilibria of their model partition the type space into two
sets of agents: those who pool on low education and are accepted by the peer group,
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and those who obtain higher levels of education and are rejected by the peer group.
Finally, Fang and Loury (2005) contrasts with the previous models by developing a
model in which agents do not directly derive utility from their identity, but rather
only from their consumption. Their model also endogenizes identity as a social event
that helps agents share risk, rather than simply an expression of an individual’s values
or preferences. Thus the model they develop allows for different social contexts to
generate different equilibrium identity configurations, some of which may be inefficient
while being fully rational on the part of individuals.
This theoretical literature highlights a distinguishing feature of Anderson’s work,
which is the importance of reputation relative to identity. According to Anderson’s
ethnography, for the vast majority of African American children in high poverty,
socially isolated neighborhoods, the primary incentive for accepting a street identity
or behaving according to street norms is not racial identity, but rather the direct threat
of violence. That is to say, if such children are playing a two-audience signalling game
along some dimensions of behavior, interpersonal violence plays a very important role
in the interpretation of their signals.
2.1.2 Sociology: Hip Hop
Since Section 3 specifies a partial equilibrium model, an important concern is
whether individual choices create general equilibrium effects by changing non-pecuniary
rewards. However, “the power of mass media images to define social reality” (hooks
(2006), p 212) diminishes this concern. Consider the important relationship between
hip hop and African American identity: “We have arrived at a landmark moment in
modern culture when a solid segment (if not a majority) of an entire generation of
African-American youth understands itself as defined primarily by a musical, cultural
form” (Rose (2008), p 9). The fact “popular culture has come to authoritatively fill
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the void where other institutions . . . are beginning to disappear” (Dirks and Mueller
(2007)) is important because of the recent evolution of commercial hip hop. In partic-
ular, commercial hip hop has grown to express fewer and fewer aspects of the African
American experience, and has largely embraced the code of the street (Rose (2008)).4
Thus the current form and influence of commercial hip hop reduce concerns of general
equilibrium effects from individual choices.
2.2 Relevant Empirical Evidence
2.2.1 Direct Evidence
Direct tests of the hypotheses generated by Anderson’s work are presented in a
recent study by the National Institute of Justice (Stewart and Simons (2009)). An-
alyzing the results of surveys with over 800 African American youth in Georgia and
Iowa, the study finds that those who internalize the code of the street are more prone
to violence in the future. Furthermore, adolescents who had experienced racial dis-
crimination were also more likely to engage in violent behavior, supporting Anderson’s
claim that the street culture is a product of alienation.
2.2.2 Identity and Education
There is contradictory empirical evidence on whether African American children
face different peer pressures related to education than white children. The litera-
4Here it is important to note that social forces such as economics or education have more influence
on outcomes than entertainment (Perry (2008)), that hip hop as an art form encompasses many
genres other than commercial hip hop (Perry (2004)), and that commercial hip hop has been heavily
influenced by the consumer demand of whites (Hurt (2006)). In fact, the consumer demand of whites
has received much attention. Critics point to its influence not only in music, but also in film (hooks
(1999)) and television (Gray (2004)), when noting the ubiquitousness of images associating black
identity with narrow aspects of the code of the street. Some critics have even argued that minstrel
shows during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries played to white fears and stereotypes no more
than do modern depictions of blacks in the mass media (Lee (2000)).
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ture provides evidence supporting the fictive kinship theory of Fordham and Ogbu
(1986) (Fryer and Jackson (2007), Patacchini and Zenou (2006)), as well as con-
flicting evidence (Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey (1998), Cook and Ludwig (1997),
Karolyn Tyson and Castellino (2005)). Given this lack of consensus, it is worth briefly
considering evidence from the NLSY97, as well as a few of the reasons other than
fictive kinship that African Americans might be less engaged in school that white
children.5 As discussed in Neckerman (2007) (pp 72-80), class relations have evolved
differently in African American neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods. While
upper class whites were removed from working class whites, all classes of blacks lived
in close proximity to each other due to segregation. Thus the importance of educa-
tion as a signal of class status may have created more animosity towards education in
African American communities than in white communities. African American chil-
dren may also be less engaged in school than their white counterparts if they do not
feel secure. Table 2 presents evidence that black males in the NLSY97 born in 1982-
84 are much more likely to have seen someone shot at than white males, also tend to
hear more gunshots in their neighborhoods, and are less likely to report feeling safe
at school. Table 2 also shows that although black and white males in the NLSY97
report being equally likely to have been threatened while at school, black males are
more likely to have actually been in a fight at school. Low quality schools (Hanushek
and Rivkin (2006)) and Eurocentric curricula (Asante (1991)) could also lead African
American children to be less engaged in school than their white counterparts.
Returning to the literature on peer effects and academic engagement, it is impor-
tant to examine measures of attitudes and expectations, and not simply measures of
knowledge. For example, Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey (1998) use as one measure
a variable from the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS88) on
5It is also worth noting here that fictive kinship is only one element of Ogbu’s cultural-ecological
model (Ogbu (2008)).
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students’ level of agreement with the statement: “Education is important for getting
a job later on.” Consider how one should interpret the results after asking Americans
how much they agree with an analogous statement: “Diet and exercise are important
for health later on.” Agreement with this statement implies an understanding of
the relationships between diet, exercise, and health; it does not imply that American
society is conducive to a lifestyle that includes eating healthy and exercising regularly.
It is also important to consider that institutions determine how peer pressures
affect outcomes. Suppose that black and white children face similar peer pressures.
Even if black and white parents have similar educational expectations for their chil-
dren (Table 3), similar peer pressures could still have different effects on the behavior
of African American children due to differences in their parents’ ability to support
those expectations (Table 3, Harris and Robinson (2007)), the ability of state insti-
tutions to provide personal security (Anderson (1999)), or one’s exposure to main-
stream institutions and individuals (Wilson (1987)). Finally, consider evidence from
the NLSY97 regarding the academic engagement of black children relative to white
children. Table 4 presents data on time spent doing homework, reading for plea-
sure, and watching television that are consistent with Cook and Ludwig (1997) and
Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey (1998). However, Table 4 and Figure 2 present data
from the NLSY97 that contrast with those from the NELS88 reported in Cook and
Ludwig (1997), indicating that black males have a different relationship with their
schools than their white counterparts.6 Taken together, the empirical evidence on the
differences in the academic experiences of black and white children does not does not
lend itself to simple characterization.
6Further demonstrating this point, Table 5 shows that African American males are more likely
than their white counterparts to be in a lower grade by the age of 12, despite the fact black males
tend to start school earlier than white males (Aliprantis (2010)). Black males also graduate from
high school at lower rates than white males for all initial grade levels at age 12 (Table 5).
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2.2.3 Crime
Most empirical work on crime focuses on the standard pecuniary rewards for such
behavior, with little attention paid to non-pecuniary incentives. For example, Imai
and Krishna (2004) find that the possibility of adverse labor market outcomes has
large effects on criminal behavior due to forward looking behavior. Lochner (2004)
finds that the lower opportunity and incarceration costs for young, uneducated men
to commit crime can explain patterns in criminal participation. One key feature
of Lochner (2004) is that while agents may accumulate standard human capital,
their ability for criminal behavior is fixed. In contrast, Imai et al. (2004) allows
for criminal experience to increase agents’ ability to commit crimes. They find that
this effect on behavior is largest for the non-criminal types of their model. Related
to both crime and peer effects, Bayer et al. (2009) look at data from correctional
facilities in Florida, and find that the type of peer group to which one is exposed
affects the probability of recidivism for the type of crime an individual has already
committed. The model of crime most similar to the one specified in this paper is that
of Mocan et al. (2005), which allows agents to simultaneously hold both standard
and criminal capital. However, the model in Mocan et al. (2005) is not estimated.
Durlauf and Nagin (2009) provide a review of the literature on the deterrent effects
of imprisonment.
2.2.4 Neighborhood Effects
Of particular interest for understanding how effects of the code of the street vary
by neighborhoods is Moving to Opportunity (MTO), an experiment in which house-
holds living in high-poverty US housing projects in five cities were allowed to enter a
lottery for housing vouchers enabling them to move to lower poverty neighborhoods.7
7The MTO sites were Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York.
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The MTO sample is mainly black, and, in contrast to researchers’ expectations of uni-
versally positive effects, the findings from the experiment show that the effects of the
program are mixed. In particular, there were negative effects on young males with
respect to physical health, risky behavior, smoking and non-sports injuries (Kling
et al. (2007)), as well as problem behaviors and property crime (Kling et al. (2005)).8
Although the offer to relocate families from high to low poverty neighborhoods
has no ITT effect on reading and math test scores for children over all MTO sites
(Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006)), a recent evaluation of the MTO data has shown that
moving to a less distressed neighborhood in Chicago and Baltimore does in fact im-
prove children’s achievement test scores. Burdick-Will et al. (2009) note not only
that Chicago and Baltimore had far higher homicide rates than the other cities in
MTO in which there were no treatment effects, but also that the differences in local
area violent crimes between control and either experimental or Section 8 groups were
larger in Chicago and Baltimore than the other MTO cities. Based on these obser-
vations, Burdick-Will et al. (2009) hypothesize that exposure to violence is the most
important neighborhood effect on children’s achievement test scores.
Relating to both neighborhood effects and the code of the street, Sharkey (2006)
uses longitudinal data from Chicago to create a measure of adolescents’ perceptions
of their ability to avoid violent confrontations and find ways to be safe in their neigh-
borhoods. These perceptions, which the author defines as street efficacy, are found
8Although MTO provides valuable insights for understanding many important, policy-relevant
neighborhood effects, there are important reasons not to interpret its results as tests of the hypotheses
proposed in Wilson (1987). As noted in the literature reviewed here, only about a quarter of eligible
families applied to enroll in MTO (Ludwig et al. (2008)), and no more than 60% of those receiving
vouchers were compliers (Kling et al. (2007)). One indication that MTO volunteer families may
be different than the general population is that the test scores of their children are considerably
higher than one would expect given their demographic characteristics (Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006)).
In addition to these concerns regarding the representative nature of the MTO sample, another issue
when interpreting results from MTO is that short-run costs from moving could be considerable
(Hanushek et al. (2004)). Finally, when considering the gender differences of MTO outcomes, Kling
et al. (2007) discuss ethnographic evidence that both the timing and durability of neighborhood
effects on young males are important.
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to be related to the probability youth resort to violence or surround themselves with
delinquent peers. However, an important finding from Sharkey (2006) is that street
efficacy does not mediate the association between concentrated neighborhood disad-
vantage and individual violence.
2.2.5 Structural Models of Human Capital Accumulation
In addition to the literature directly related to the code of the street, there is also
a more broadly relevant literature using structural dynamic discrete choice models
to explain education and labor market outcomes.9 Eckstein and Wolpin (1999b)
formulate a model of grade progression through high school in which youths make
sequential decisions about school attendance and work. After estimating the model
on a sample of white males, they conclude that changing the traits with which youths
come to high school will have an empirically much larger impact on graduation rates
that policies aimed only at work or attendance while in high school. Similarly, after
estimating a dynamic model of educational and occupational choices over the life cycle
on a sample of white males, Keane and Wolpin (1997) find that 90% of the variance
in lifetime utility can be accounted for by unobserved endowment heterogeneity at
age 16.
There is also evidence that unobserved age 16 skill endowments play a very im-
portant role in explaining racial differences in education and labor market outcomes.
Keane and Wolpin (2000) find that larger portions of the racial gap in males’ lifetime
wages would be closed by equalizing age 16 skill endowments than by policies aimed
at increasing graduation rates or even by a wage subsidy directly targeted towards
blacks. On this topic it should be noted that Neal and Johnson (1996) arrive at a
very similar conclusion using very different methodology. Estimating reduced-form
9See Aguirregabiria and Mira (2009) or Belzil (2007) for recent reviews.
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wage equations, they find that age 16 AFQT scores explain nearly three-fourths of the
racial wage gap for young men and all of the gap for young women. Finally, Cameron
and Heckman (2001) find that racial differences in educational outcomes are best ex-
plained by the long-term influences of family income and family background. After
also modeling schooling attainment as the outcome of sequential decisions made at
each age and grade, they find that equating age 15 unobserved endowments actually
makes blacks more likely than whites to complete high school or to enter college.
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Chapter 3
A Model of Human Capital
Accumulation
In modeling the environment faced by black young males, we follow Schultz (1961)
and define human capital to be useful skills and knowledge that people acquire. The
key insight from the Sociology literature discussed in Section 2 is that human capital
is context specific. That is, the skills and knowledge useful to a person are not fixed,
but depend on both the society and the place in that society in which a person
lives.1 It is with this insight in mind that we define street capital to be the skills
and knowledge useful for operating under the code of the street.2 Furthermore, the
model assumes learning by doing, so that street capital is acquired in the process of
participating in street behavior. While this type of human capital may be ignored
by the formal labor market due to the fact it “is not always useful or valued in the
wider society, . . . it is capital nonetheless. It is recognized and valued on the streets,
and to lack it is to be vulnerable there” (Anderson (1999), p 105).
1The factors influencing which skills and forms of knowledge tend to be adopted play an impor-
tant role in development (Diamond (1999), Jones (2008)).
2Street capital is defined as a form of human capital since we consider it to be a type of skill
or knowledge. Street capital is distinct from social capital in large part because it is something
possessed by an individual rather than a group of individuals (Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004)).
18
We incorporate measures of this type of human capital into the framework devel-
oped in Keane and Wolpin (1997) in order to quantify how incentives to accumulate
street capital affect the education and labor market outcomes of black young males.
Consider a model in which agents may be engaged in one of four standard behaviors:
work, education, neither, or prison. Agents choose between work, education, or nei-
ther, but are incarcerated with a probability that is a function of past choices. An
agent participates in the education sector by attending school, which precludes partic-
ipation in either the work or outside sectors. An agent participates in neither sector
by not working and not attending school. Agents are unable to make any choices
if they are in prison. In addition to choosing between the three standard choices,
agents are also able to choose between participating in street or decent behaviors
each period. An agent participates in violent street activities by attacking someone,
carrying a gun, or belonging to a gang. An agent participates in non-violent street
activities by breaking the rules of their school, selling drugs, stealing, committing a
property crime, or coming into contact with the criminal justice system.3 And an
agent chooses to participate in decent activities by abstaining from either type of
street activity.
At each age a ∈ {a, . . . , A}, an agent selects one of 12 mutually exclusive choices
generated by the choices described above. Let dk(a) = 1 indicate that choice k is
selected at age a, so that dk(a) ∈ {0, 1} for k ∈ {1, . . . , 12}, with
∑12
k=1 dk(a) = 1.
The work alternatives are d1(a) = 1 for work and decent, d2(a) = 1 for work and
violent street, d3(a) = 1 for work and non-violent street, and d4(a) = 1 for work and
both types of street behavior. The education (dk(a) = 1; k = 5, 6, 7, 8) and neither
(dk(a) = 1; k = 9, 10, 11, 12) alternatives are defined analogously. Let sv(a) = 1 if an
agent participates in violent street activities at age a, while sv(a) = 0 if an agent does
3There are many ways one could define street behavior in line with Anderson (1999); these
definitions are also motivated by the variables available in the data.
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not participate in violent street activities at age a (ie, sv(a) = d2(a)+ d4(a)+ d6(a)+
d8(a) + d10(a) + d12(a)). Define snv(a) analogously for non-violent street activities
(ie, snv(a) = d3(a) + d4(a) + d7(a) + d8(a) + d11(a) + d12(a)), and let the vector be
s(a) ≡ (sv(a), snv(a)).
Denote an agent’s cumulative street capital at the start of age a by (xv(a), xnv(a)),
where:
xv(a) =



xv(a) if a = a ;
xv(a) +
∑a−1
t=a sv(t) if a > a,
and
xnv(a) =



xnv(a) if a = a ;
xnv(a) +
∑a−1
t=a snv(t) if a > a.
Let g(a) be the highest grade of schooling completed at age a, x(a) be work experience
at age a, 1{·} the indicator function, and c1(a−1), c2(a−1), c3(a−1) be indicators for
whether an agent chose, respectively, to work, attend school, or neither the previous
period. We specify a standard wage function:
w(a) = rexp
[
α0 + α1g(a) + α2x(a)− α3x
2(a) + εw(a)
]
.
Returns in each sector of the economy are specified as follows:
Rw(a) = w(a)− α4c3(a− 1) + ρ1{g(a) ≥ 12}
Re(a) = β0 − β11{g(a) ≥ 12} − β21{g(a) ≥ 16} − β3[c1(a− 1) + c3(a− 1)]
+ β4xv(a) + β5xnv(a) + ρ1{g(a) ≥ 12}+ ε
e(a)
Rh(a) = γ0 + γ1xv(a) + γ2xnv(a) + ρ1{g(a) ≥ 12}+ ε
h(a).
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While Rw follows a standard specification, the specifications of Re and Rh are moti-
vated by theory and empirical evidence. This specification is in line with the propo-
sition in Akerlof and Kranton (2002) that “For groups that are less universal [than
gender groups], econometricians need to use ethnographic information that provides
the signifiers” (p 1177). Theoretically, dropping out of school or choosing neither to
attend school nor to work are considered to be indications of alienation from main-
stream society. The specifications of Re and Rh are then consistent with Anderson’s
point that for many young black men, participating in street behavior can be seen as
an investment “in their own alienation” (Anderson (2008a), p 17), so that “In time,
for black youth, any fruits associated with the mainstream culture pale against the
psychic rewards of the oppositional culture” (Anderson (2008a), p 18). Empirically,
Figures 4 and 5 show that black males with higher levels of street capital have a
higher probability of choosing neither to work nor to attend school. Finally, note
that under this specification, α4 may be interpreted as the cost of searching for work,
and β3 as a reentry cost for school. The parameter ρ is the return to graduating from
high school, which individuals receive at all future ages, regardless of future choices,
once they graduate from high school.
Returns to street and decent behaviors are as follows:
Rsv(a) = φ0 + φ1xv(a) + φ2sv(a− 1)
+ φ3sv(a− 1)snv(a− 1) + φ4sv(a)snv(a) + ε
s
v(a)
Rsnv(a) = ψ0 + ψ1xnv(a) + ψ2snv(a− 1)
+ ψ3sv(a− 1)snv(a− 1) + ψ4sv(a)snv(a) + ε
s
nv(a)
Rd(a) = 0.
The problem of identifying the relative importance of identity versus reputation in
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generating street behavior is analogous to the problem of identifying whether attend-
ing additional years of school generates skills or simply serves as a signal (See Weiss
(1995).).4 Preferences, as well as neighborhood effects due to reputation and iden-
tity concerns, are represented in the given specifications of Rsnv(a) and R
s
v(a) by the
constant terms φ0 and ψ0. The unobserved heterogeneity in these terms cannot be
attributed to any one of these factors alone, but rather represent the joint effect of
innate preferences and situational influences.
Each agent’s incarceration status is denoted by p(a) ∈ {0, 1}, and the probability
that agents are incarcerated at each age, Pr[p(a) = 1], is determined by a latent
index model. We assume there is a latent index p∗(a) which is a function of past
street behavior, past incarceration, whether an agent is over 18 years old, and a
random shock εp(a):
p∗(a) = λ0 + λ1sv(a− 1) + λ2snv(a− 1) + λ3p(a− 1) + λ41{a ≥ 18}+ εp(a). (3.1)
Incarceration p(a) follows the rule:
p(a) =



1 if p∗(a) ≥ 0 ,
0 if p∗(a) < 0 .
(3.2)
We assume that the εp(a) are distributed according to a contemporaneously and
serially independent logistic distribution, so that Equations 3.1 and 3.2 are a logit
model with the probability of being incarcerated:
Pr[p(a) = 1] = Λ[λ0 + λ1sv(a− 1) + λ2snv(a− 1) + λ3p(a− 1) + λ41{a ≥ 18}]. (3.3)
4It could either be due to an increase in skills or due to a signal sent to employers, but higher
educational attainment is associated with a higher wage. Similarly, it could be due to one’s identity
or one’s need for a reputation, but higher levels of street capital are associated with an increase in
the return to participating in more street behavior.
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Each agent’s utility at age a is:
U(a) =



∑4
k=1R
w(a)dk(a) +
∑8
k=5R
e(a)dk(a) +
∑12
k=9R
h(a)dk(a)
+Rsv(a)sv(a) +R
s
nv(a)snv(a) +
∑12
k=1 θkdk(a) if p(a) = 0 ,
0 if p(a) = 1,
where θk for k ∈ {1, . . . , 12} is an interaction term between standard and street
choices (with θ1 = θ5 = θ9 = 0). With the exception of εp(a), we assume the other
error terms in ε(a) ≡ (εw(a), εe(a), εh(a), εsv(a), ε
s
nv(a), εp(a)) are distributed according
to contemporaneously and serially independent normal distributions. At each age
agents observe the parameters of the model and their state vector:
S(a) ≡ (g(a), x(a), xv(a), xnv(a), ed(a− 1), s(a− 1), p(a− 1), ε(a), τ, a)
and choose d(a) ≡ (d1(a), . . . , d12(a)) to maximize the discounted sum of future re-
turns. If we denote the optimal decision rule over time by d∗(a) = d∗(S(a))|S, then
the value function is:
V (S(a)) = E
{ A∑
t=a
δt−a U(a)|d∗(a), S(a)
}
.
Define each alternative specific value function as
Vk(S(a)) = U(a)|dk(a)=1 + δE
{
V (S(a + 1)|S(a), dk(a) = 1)
}
,
so we may write the value function as:
V (S(a)) = max
dk(a)
{
Vk(S(a))
}
.
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The state vector is updated according to the following rule at the end of each age:
g(a+ 1) = g(a) + max{d5(a), d6(a), d7(a), d8(a)}
x(a+ 1) = x(a) + max{d1(a), d2(a), d3(a), d4(a)}
xv(a+ 1) = xv(a) + sv(a)
xnv(a+ 1) = xnv(a) + snv(a)
p(a+ 1) =



1 with probability Pr[p(a) = 1]
0 with probability 1− Pr[p(a) = 1].
The terminal value function is
V (S(A)) = max
dk(A)
{
U(A) + δV (S(A+ 1)|S(A), dk(A) = 1)
}
,
where
V (S(A+ 1)|S(A), dk(A) = 1)
= ζ1[g(A+ 1)− 8] + ζ2x(A + 1) + ζ3xv(A+ 1) + ζ4xnv(A + 1)|S(A),dk(A)=1.
To close the model, there are T heterogeneous types. Agents are heterogeneous in
the model with respect to their endowments for their three standard choices (α0, β0,
and γ0), their endowments for participating in street behavior (φ0 and ψ0), as well
as their incarceration endowment (λ0). Type probabilities are conditional on initial
grade level (πτ |g(a)), assuming g(a) to be exogenous, as well as p(a) = 0 and x(a) = 0.
Also assume that sv(a−1) and snv(a−1), and therefore xv(a) and xnv(a), follow inde-
pendent Bernoulli distributions with probability of success dependent on an agent’s
type.
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3.1 Estimation Method
The algorithm for estimating the model is the Simulated Maximum Likelihood
(SML) algorithm introduced by Keane and Wolpin (2001). Let Oi be an observed
outcome history, where there are i = 1, . . . , I observed individuals. Specifying the
initial conditions S̃n, generate n = 1, . . . , N simulated outcome histories Õn. Let
Õn = (S̃n, Õna=a, . . . , Õ
n
a=A), where the simulated outcome histories are wages and
choices, Õna = (w
n(a), dn(a)), and the initial conditions are
S̃n = (gn(a), xn(a), xnv (a), x
n
nv(a), ed
n(a− 1), sn(a− 1)).
Keane and Wolpin (2001) simulate the probability of the observed outcome history
for person i, P (Oi), by assuming that all observed outcomes are measured with error,
so there is a positive probability that any observed outcome could be generated by
any simulated outcome history. If P (Oi|Õn) is the probability that observed outcome
history Oi is generated by the simulated outcome history Õn, then P (Oi|Õn) is the
product of classification error rates for discrete outcomes and measurement error
densities for wages.5 Thus we are able to construct the unbiased simulator:
P̂N(O
i) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
P (Oi|Õn) (3.4)
To handle the k = 1, . . . , K heterogeneous types, where πk|S̃n is the probability a
person is type k given initial conditions S̃n, we now simulate N/K outcome vectors
5The example given in Keane and Wolpin (2001) for illustration is as follows: Assume a sin-
gle discrete outcome with error classification rates P (1|1) = 0.9, P (1|0) = 0.1, P (0|1) = 0.1,
and P (0|0) = 0.9. If T = 4 and −9 indicates a missing observation, then P (1 0 1 0 | 1 1 1 1) =
(0.9)(0.1)(0.9)(0.1) = 0.0081 and P (−9 0 − 9 1 | 1 0 1 1) = (0.9)(0.9) = 0.81. Note that without
measurement error Oi and Õn would be inconsistent (ie, P (Oi|Õn) = 0).
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Õnk for each type k. The unbiased simulator then becomes:
P̂N(O
i) =
K∑
k=1
N/K∑
n=1
P (Oi|Õnk )
πk|S̃n
N/K
. (3.5)
New outcome histories are drawn for each new trial parameter vector, which are
then used to generate the simulated probabilities according to Equation 3.5. A sim-
plex algorithm is used to maximize the resulting simulated likelihood function. Stan-
dard errors are obtained using the outer product of the gradient vectors. The nu-
merical gradients are computed using a proportional step size of h = 0.001 for each
parameter.
To specify the misclassification process, let ci(a) ∈ {1, 2, 3} be agent i’s choice with
respect to Work (ci(a) = 1), School (ci(a) = 2), and Neither (ci(a) = 3). Further, let
c∗i (a) be the agent’s true choice, and ci(a) be the agent’s recorded choice. Defining
f [c(a) = 1] = 1
I
∑I
i=1 1{ci(a) = 1}, we follow Keane and Wolpin (2001) and specify
the misclassification process to be as follows:
c=1∏
0a
= Pr(ci(a) = 1|c
∗
i (a) = 1) = EC + (1−EC)f [c(a) = 1]
c=1∏
1a
= Pr(ci(a) = 1|c
∗
i (a) = 2)
= Pr(ci(a) = 1|c
∗
i (a) = 3) =
(
1−
c=1∏
0a
)
f [c(a) = 1]
1− f [c(a) = 1]
where EC is a parameter to be estimated, and
∏c=2 and
∏c=3 are defined analogously.
Define similar misclassification processes for incarceration (p(a) ∈ {0, 1}) and street
choices (sv(a) ∈ {0, 1} and snv(a) ∈ {0, 1}), with ESP , ESV , ESN ,
∏sv , ∏si, and
∏p defined analogously.
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The measurement error process for hourly wages is assumed to be multiplicative:
w(a) = w∗(a)exp(εw(a))
where
εw(a) ∼ N(0, σ
2
w).
The sample likelihood is then simply the product
L(θ|O1, O2, . . . , OI) =
I∏
i=1
P̂N(O
i).
Once estimation is complete, we can assign a set of type probabilities to each
individual in the sample. By Bayes’ rule and Equation 3.5:
Pr(τ = k|Oi) =
Pr(Oi|τ = k)Pr(τ = k)
Pr(Oi)
=
K
N
∑N/K
n=1 P (O
i|Õnk )πk|S̃n
K
N
∑K
k=1
∑N/K
n=1 P (O
i|Õnk )πk|S̃n
. (3.6)
Fifty draws are used for the numerical integration of the Emax function, E{V (S(a+
1)|S(a), dk(a) = 1)}, which is performed at each value of the state space S(a) between
the ages of 12 and 30. When constructing P̂N(O
i), 5,000 simulated outcome histo-
ries Õnk are used for each type τ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, so that 20,000 outcome histories are
simulated overall.
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Chapter 4
Data
4.1 Sample
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) is a survey designed
to be representative of people living in the United States in 1997 who were born
between 1980 and 1984. In addition to the representative random sample of 6,748
respondents, there is a supplemental sample of 2,236 black and Hispanic respondents,
for an overall total of 8,984 individuals. This analysis uses the 1,198 black males in
the NLSY97.
4.2 Time Periods and Age
Each year starts on October 1st. On that day each agent wakes up, observes his
state variable, and makes his choice for the year. The state variable is updated as
described in Section 3 on the last day of the year, September 30th, and on October
1st the agent wakes up to a new state variable and makes his choice for the new year.
According to this definition, for example, the 1997 year is from October 1st of 1997
until September 30th of 1998. Table 6 shows the age of black males in the NLSY97
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at the date they are interviewed in each round, and Table 6 shows the age of black
males in October of the year starting on October 1st, which is the age assigned to
each agent for the year.
4.3 Work and Wages
The event history of the NLSY97 has weekly data on total hours worked in
employee-type, self-employed, or freelance jobs. In order to align this data with
the time periods defined above, we define the total hours worked in any year to be
the total hours worked between the 40th week of the calendar year and the 39th week
of the next calendar year.1 An individual chooses to work if he does not attend school
and works a total of at least 780 hours during the year. In addition to civilian work
data, the event history also has weekly data on military employment. An individual
is also considered to be working if he is employed by the military for at least 25 weeks
of the year.
Weekly wages for self-employed and employee-type jobs are the sum over all such
jobs worked of the product of hourly compensation and hours worked at each job.2
This data is found in the event history of the NLSY97. Annual wages are simply the
sum over weekly wages for the year defined above, which are deflated by the gross
national product deflator, with 2000 as the base year.3 Military pay grade information
is not used.
1For example, total hours worked in 1997 is the total hours worked between the 40th week of
1997 and the 39th week of 1998.
2Up to three such jobs may be worked at any one time, and up to nine over the course of a year.
3Also included in annual wages are earnings from freelance jobs, which are distinguished from
self-employment by age and compensation.
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4.4 School Attendance
The event history in the NLSY97 has annual data on the grade individuals at-
tended during a given academic year up to the 12th grade. The NLSY97 also has a
created variable listing the highest grade completed by a respondent prior to the start
of each academic school year. Using these data, an agent chooses to attend school
if he reports both attending and completing a grade during an academic year. In
addition, the event history also has monthly data on school enrollment status. An
individual is also considered to be enrolled in school if he has attended college for six
or more months during the year.
4.5 Neither Work Nor School
An agent chooses the outside sector if he chooses neither to attend school nor to
work, and he is not incarcerated.
4.6 Street Behavior
As defined in Section 3, an agent participates in violent street activities by at-
tacking someone, carrying a gun, or belonging to a gang. Each of these questions is
self-reported in the NLSY97.4
An agent participates in non-violent street activities by breaking the rules of their
school, selling drugs, stealing, committing a property crime, or breaking the law.
Respondents self-report if they have helped to sell illegal drugs, if they have stolen
more than $50, as well as if they have committed any property crimes. While the
data in the NLSY97 on suspensions and arrests are obviously imperfect measures
4See Thornberrry and Krohn (2002) for evidence on the reliability of using self-reported survey
data on street behavior.
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of whether individuals have broken the law or the rules of their school, this issue is
handled in our estimation algorithm through the ESI parameter to be estimated, as
discussed in Section 3.1. Note that we ignore suspensions occurring after grade 12.
With the exception of suspensions and arrests, data on street behavior in the
NLSY97 is collected on a different time frame than the work and schooling data in
the event history. Respondents are asked in the first round if they have ever taken
part in certain behavior, as well as if they have taken part in such behavior in the
past 12 months. In each subsequent round respondents are asked if they have taken
part in specified behavior since the date of the last interview. Since the interviews
do not take place on a regular interval, this data will not be consistent with respect
to the time periods defined in Section 4.2. Thus we are forced to make the following
assumptions with respect to the timing of street behavior. If a respondent reports
participating in some type of street behavior since the date of the last interview, it
is assumed that the respondent has participated in this behavior in each month since
the month following the last interview, including the month of this year’s interview.
If a respondent was not interviewed in the the most recent round, then their response
is assumed for the previous 12 months as well. For each year in which we observe an
agent’s street choices we construct the ratio of months in which an agent participates
in street behavior to the months during that year in which the agent’s choice is
observed. An individual participates in street behavior during the year defined in
Section 4.2 if this ratio is at least 1
2
.
4.7 Incarceration
Respondents are asked in the NLSY97 if they have spent time in a correctional
institution since the date of their last interview. If they respond positively, they are
then asked the start and end month of each spell in prison. Using this monthly data,
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we then define an individual to have been in prison p(a) = 1 at age a if they spent
6 or more months of the year in a correctional institution. The analogous probation
data is not used in the construction of this variable. It should also be noted that data
is missing for the 2003 (7th) round of the NLSY97 due to a design flaw (McClaskie
(2009)).
4.8 Descriptive Statistics
Tables 7–22 show descriptive statistics of black males in the NLSY97 for the given
variable definitions. Table 7 shows the choices between work, school, and neither by
age. Note the high percentage of black males who are neither in school nor in the
labor force after age 15. Also note that included in the neither category are those who
are incarcerated. Table 8 shows the decisions of black males by age over all twelve of
the mutually exclusive choices in the model. Note that street behavior is most likely
to occur while children are attending school, with the majority of such behavior being
non-violent. However, a large share of children in school do partake in violent street
behavior, whether alone or together with non-violent street behavior. Also note there
is a sizeable portion of young men who participate in violent street behavior while
also choosing to work.
Tables 10 and 11 present the unconditional transition matrices between choices.
Choices regarding standard human capital accumulation are much more persistent
than choices regarding street capital accumulation. Nearly half of those choosing
either violent or non-violent street behavior alone choose to partake in no street
behavior the next period. In contrast, less than 20% of those who engage in both
types of street behavior abstain from street behavior altogether in the next period.
Table 12 shows the frequency of each component of street behavior by age. At-
tacking someone is the most frequent source of violent street behavior, especially at
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younger ages. However, the rate of attacks decreases over age. In contrast, the rate
of carrying a gun stays relatively constant over age, so that by the early twenties
this is the greatest source of violent street behavior. At early ages suspensions and
property crimes are by far the greatest sources of non-violent street behavior. These
behaviors decline with age, so that by the early twenties arrests and drug dealing are
the greatest sources of non-violent street behavior. Table 22 shows the percentage of
black males who had spent time in prison according to our definition.
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Chapter 5
Estimation Results
5.1 Model Fit
Figures 6 – 22 show actual data from the NLSY97 together with data from 5,000
individuals simulated from the model using the estimated parameter values. Tables
7–14 present this data in tabular form. As displayed in Figures 10–13, the esti-
mated model slightly over-predicts each type of street behavior, leading to an under-
prediction of decent behavior. It may be seen from Figures 6–8 that the estimated
model also slightly under-predicts the share of black males working, but otherwise
fits data on standard human capital choices very well. The estimated model also does
a good job of capturing the dropout rate of black males (Figure 9), but has some
difficulty capturing changes in imprisonment over the life cycle (Table 22). Figures
14–21 display kernel density estimates of actual and predicted wages, and Table 14
displays moments from each distribution.
The estimated model is also able to match the persistence of choices in the data.
The transition matrix presented in Table 10 shows that the estimated model captures
the persistence and temporal patterns of standard choices. The transitions between
street choices are more difficult for the model to fit: most match the data, but the
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model does have trouble fitting the persistence in transitions between only non-violent
and both types of street behavior (Table 11). The model is rejected by χ2 goodness
of fit tests for both of these transition matrices.
Tables 15–17 report parameter estimates along with outer product gradient (OPG)
standard errors.
5.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity and Demographic
Characteristics
Note that the parameter estimates reported in Tables 15 and 16 indicate the
code of the street has heterogeneous effects over the population of all young black
males. This is evident from a quick characterization of the types: type 1 individuals
have large age 12 education and labor market endowments, and have endowments
that discourage street behavior. The endowments of type 4 individuals are not as
advantageous for education and labor market outcomes, but also do not favor engaging
in street behavior. In contrast, type 2 and type 3 individuals have some interest in
engaging in street behavior. Type 2 and type 3 individuals have endowments suited
towards both types of street behaviors, with type 2 individuals more suited towards
violent street behavior, and type 3 individuals more suited for non-violent street
behavior. Note that type 2 and type 3 individuals make up a much greater share of
the mixture for those who are enrolled in sixth grade or lower at age 12 compared with
those who are enrolled in at least seventh grade by that time. Also note that since the
NLSY97 does not contain detailed neighborhood variables for each round, individual
preferences, as well as neighborhood and peer-group effects, are all incorporated into
the heterogeneity by type contained in the constant terms φ0 and ψ0.
Table 18 illustrates how these type-specific parameters characterize choices by re-
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porting the results of 5,000 simulated outcome histories for each type. At age 21 type
1 individuals are either working or enrolled in school. Type 4 individuals at age 21
are nearly all working, with small shares either enrolled in school or not participating
in schooling or the labor market. In contrast, at age 21 over half of type 2 and type 3
individuals are neither working nor enrolled in school. Essentially all type 1 individ-
uals graduate from high school, with over 80% going on to receive a college degree.
Type 4 individuals, who participate in the labor market at a much higher rate than
type 2 or type 3 individuals, fair only marginally better in educational attainment
than type 2 and type 3 individuals. And while type 1 and type 4 individuals abstain
from street behavior, type 2 and type 3 individuals, respectively, tend to specialize
in violent and non-violent street behavior.
Unfortunately, the estimated model does not aid in understanding whether the
heterogeneity in estimated parameters over types are due to innate preferences or
geographic and social influences. However, it is possible to examine how these types
are related to demographic characteristics. For each individual in the sample the
probability distribution of types conditional on their observed data is calculated using
Bayes’ rule as displayed in Equation 3.6. Table 19 shows the distribution of types in
the sample, as well as the mean type probabilities for several subsamples. Importantly
for the counterfactual experiment discussed in Section 6.1, we see that as the number
of gunshots heard in one’s neighborhood in a typical week goes up, the proportion of
type 1 individuals decreases monotonically and the proportion of type 3 individuals
increases monotonically. The distribution of type probabilities by other subgroups all
conform with priors.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
6.1 How Would Safe Schools and Neighborhoods
Affect Outcomes?
One counterfactual policy experiment is performed to mimic changes in neighbor-
hood environments: positive utility endowments for engaging in street behaviors (φ0
and ψ0) are reduced to 0. As discussed in Section 5.2, these terms incorporate indi-
vidual preferences, as well as neighborhood and peer-group effects. Nevertheless, one
interpretation of setting these parameters to 0 is that it replicates moving children
from neighborhoods where the code of the street is very influential to neighborhoods
in which children no longer have incentives to engage in street behaviors.
This counterfactual policy experiment makes sense if we consider the code of the
street to be a specific type of neighborhood effect, and there is indeed evidence that
interpersonal violence is an important neighborhood effect. In addition to Anderson’s
ethnographic evidence on the importance of interpersonal violence, evidence from the
MTO experiment indicates that the fear of random violence (Kling et al. (2005)) and
the need to preserve one’s reputation (Kling et al. (2007)) have important effects on
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outcomes. As well, a recent examination of the MTO data has shown that moving to a
less distressed neighborhood in Chicago and Baltimore does in fact improve children’s
achievement test scores (Burdick-Will et al. (2009)).1 Since this is not true of children
in all MTO sites (Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006)), Burdick-Will et al. (2009) examine key
differences between Chicago and Baltimore and the other MTO cities. The authors
note not only that Chicago and Baltimore had far higher homicide rates than the
other cities in MTO, but also that the differences in local area violent crime rates
between control and treatment groups were larger in Chicago and Baltimore than
in the other MTO cities. Based on these observations, Burdick-Will et al. (2009)
hypothesize that exposure to violence is the most important neighborhood effect on
children’s achievement test scores.
In the counterfactual experiment in which the code of the street as a neighborhood
effect is reduced, there are very large changes in the labor market outcomes of black
young men, with substantial effects on education outcomes as well. These results are
displayed in Figures 23–30 and Table 20. About 20% more black young men after the
age of 20 choose to work. Although smaller, the effects on educational attainment
are still considerable; about 7% more black young men graduate from high school.
The results of this counterfactual experiment suggest that exposure to interpersonal
violence has important effects on outcomes, aligning well with the evidence presented
in Burdick-Will et al. (2009).
1An important implication of these findings is that schools need not be the only channel through
which achievement may be influenced (Dobbie and Fryer (2009)).
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6.2 Can Those Heavily Invested in the Code of the
Street Be (Re-)Incorporated into Mainstream
Society?
There are also reasons to be interested in the importance of timing and durability
for effects from the code of the street. Timing and durability may be important for
understanding neighborhood effects (Sampson et al. (2008)), especially how they differ
by gender (Kling et al. (2007)).2 As well, previous research indicates that unobserved
endowments at age 16 are extremely important in explaining later education and
labor market outcomes (This work is discussed in greater detail in Section 2.2.5; see
Keane and Wolpin (1997), Keane and Wolpin (2000), Cameron and Heckman (2001),
and Neal and Johnson (1996).).
In order to quantify how important the street capital accumulated between ages 12
and 16 is for later outcomes, a counterfactual experiment is performed in which at age
16, without prior knowledge, agents are given the choice to either keep their current
stock of street capital (xv, xnv), or to set xv(17) = xnv(17) = 0. The outcomes of this
counterfactual policy experiment are shown in Figures 31–38 and Table 21. Again,
there are large effects on outcomes: After the age of 19, about 7% more of black males
choose either to attend school or work, and 12% more of black males graduate from
high school. The results of this counterfactual experiment indicate that even at older
ages, interventions are still able to have positive effects on children’s later outcomes.
2Given that their causes are not well understood, one conjecture is that the timing of effects
from the code of the street may help to explain gender differences in treatment effects from the
MTO experiment (Kling et al. (2007)), as well as early childhood interventions (Anderson (2008b))
and job training programs (Abadie et al. (2002), LaLonde (1995)).
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6.3 How Would Policies Such as a Wage Subsidy
or Conditional Cash Transfer Affect Outcomes?
A final set of counterfactual policy experiments explores the results of two policy
interventions. The first is a $2,000 annual wage subsidy, which is similar to an increase
in the minimum wage.3 The second intervention is a $2,000 conditional cash transfer
for each year of completed schooling while in high school. This second intervention
is widespread in Latin America (Todd and Wolpin (2006), Handa and Davis (2006)),
and is also currently being implemented in New York City (Miller et al. (2009)).
As seen in Figures 39–46 and Table 22, these interventions have only modest
effects on street behavior. However, the wage subsidy does have large impacts on
labor market outcomes; about 10% of black males are induced to work after the age
of 18. In contrast, the conditional cash transfer has little impact on these choices.
However, it is also true that the wage subsidy causes 5% more of black males to drop
out of high school, whereas the conditional cash transfer causes an additional 10% of
black males to graduate from high school. The results of these counterfactuals, which
follow similar patterns as those performed in Keane and Wolpin (2000), indicate that
the pecuniary incentives of such interventions have little impact on outcomes not
specifically targeted.
3$2,000 per year is the equivalent of a $1.60 per hour wage increase for the median 23 year-old
black male worker who works 24 hours per week.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In order to study the outcomes of young black men in the US, this paper de-
veloped and estimated a dynamic model of black young males’ joint decisions about
schooling, labor force participation, and street behavior. In particular, the estimated
model built on two distinct literatures within economics; one that focuses primarily
on labor market incentives, and one that primarily focuses on the non-pecuniary re-
turns to behavior. The specification of the model was guided in large part by Elijah
Anderson’s ethnographic evidence that many young black males face incentives to en-
gage in violent behavior due to weak state institutions. To empirically operationalize
Anderson’s concept of the code of the street and its influences on the choices of young
black males, the model included a distinct type of human capital defined as street
capital. Since the ethnographic evidence indicates particular education and labor
market choices are due to alienation from mainstream institutions, which increases as
individuals become more invested in the code of the street, the model was specified
with street capital changing the non-pecuniary rewards from choices.
After estimating the model on data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1997 (NLSY97), several counterfactual policy experiments indicate the effects
of the code of the street are empirically large. First, an experiment was performed to
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replicate aspects of the Moving To Opportunity (MTO) experiment. By diminishing
the immediate return to street behavior, this counterfactual mimicked the incentives
children face while growing up in neighborhoods with little influence of the code of the
street. Under this counterfactual scenario, about 20% more black young men after
the age of 20 chose to work. As well, about 7% more black young men graduated
from high school, and there was also a decrease in incarceration rates. In order to
understand the importance of street behavior between the ages of 12 and 16, an
additional counterfactual experiment was performed in which agents were given the
choice at age 16, without prior knowledge, to either keep their current stock of street
capital or to set them to zero. In this scenario about 7% more black males chose
either to work or to attend school, and an additional 12% chose to graduate from
high school. Finally, experiments were performed to assess the impact of a $2,000
wage subsidy or $2,000 conditional cash transfer for attending high school. Such a
wage subsidy increased the percentage of black males working after the age of 18 by
about 10%, and the conditional cash transfer caused an additional 10% of black males
to graduate from high school. However, the wage subsidy also induced 5% more of
black males to drop out of high school, and these policies had little impact on street
behavior or imprisonment. Together, these results indicate the code of the street is
an empirically important phenomenon when considering the outcomes of black young
men.
42
Bibliography
Abadie, A., J. Angrist, and G. Imbens (2002). Instrumental variables estimates of
the effect of subsidized training on the quantiles of trainee earnings. Economet-
rica 70 (1), 91–117.
Aguirregabiria, V. and P. Mira (2009). Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural models:
A survey. Journal of Econometrics Forthcoming.
Ainsworth-Darnell, J. W. and D. B. Downey (1998). Assessing the oppositional cul-
ture explanation for racial/ethnic differences in school performance. American
Sociological Review 63 (4), 536–553.
Akerlof, G. A. and R. E. Kranton (2000). Economics and Identity. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 115 (3), 715–753.
Akerlof, G. A. and R. E. Kranton (2002). Identity and schooling: Some lessons for
the economics of education. Journal of Economic Literature 40 (4), 1167–1201.
Aliprantis, D. (2010). Redshirting, compulsory schooling laws, and educational at-
tainment. Mimeo., University of Pennsylvania.
Anderson, E. (1990). Streetwise: Race, Class, and Change in an Urban Community.
University of Chicago Press.
43
Anderson, E. (1999). Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of
the Inner City. W. W. Norton and Company.
Anderson, E. (2002). The ideologically driven critique. American Journal of Sociol-
ogy 107 (6), 1533–1550.
Anderson, E. (2008a). Against the wall: Poor, young, black, and male. In E. Anderson
(Ed.), Against the Wall: Poor, Young, Black, and Male, pp. 3–27. University of
Pennsylvania Press.
Anderson, M. L. (2008b). Multiple inference and gender differences in the effects of
early intervention: A reevaluation of the Abecedarian, Perry Preschool, and Early
Training Projects. Journal of the American Statistical Association 103 (484), 1481–
1495.
Angrist, J. D. and V. Lavy (2002). The effect of high school matriculation awards:
Evidence from randomized trials. NBER Working Paper 9389 .
Arcidiacono, P. (2005). Affirmative action in higher education: How do admission
and financial aid rules affect future earnings? Econometrica 73 (5), 1477–1524.
Asante, M. K. (1991). The Afrocentric idea in Education. Journal of Negro Educa-
tion 60 (2), 170–180.
Austen-Smith, D. and R. G. Fryer, Jr. (2005). An economic analysis of acting white.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (2), 551–583.
Battu, H., M. Mwale, and Y. Zanou (2007). Oppositional identities and the labor
market. Journal of Population Economics 20 (3), 643–667.
Bayer, P., R. Hjalmarsson, and D. Pozen (2009). Building criminal capital be-
44
hind bars: Peer effects in juvenile corrections. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 124 (1), 105–147.
Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of
Political Economy 76 (2), 169–217.
Belzil, C. (2007). The return to schooling in structural dynamic models: A survey.
European Economic Review 51 (5), 1059–1105.
Bénabou, R. and J. Tirole (2007). Identity, dignity and taboos: Beliefs as assets. IZA
Discussion Paper No. 2583 .
Bertrand, M. and S. Mullainathan (2004). Are Emily and Greg more employable
than Lakisha and Jamal? A field experiment on labor market discrimination. The
American Economic Review 94 (4), 991–1013.
Blackmon, D. A. (2008). Slavery by Another Name: The Re-enslavement of Black
People in America from the Civil War to World War II. Doubleday.
Bowlus, A. J. and Z. Eckstein (2002). Discrimination and skill differences in an
equilibrium search model. International Economic Review 43 (4), 1309–1345.
Burdick-Will, J., J. Ludwig, S. W. Raudenbush, R. J. Sampson, L. Sanbonmatsu,
and P. Sharkey (2009). Congerging evidence for neighborhood effects on children’s
test scores: An experimental, quasi-experimental, and observational comparison.
Mimeo., Brookings Institution.
Cameron, S. V. and J. J. Heckman (2001). The dynamics of educational attainment
for black, hispanic, and white males. Journal of Political Economy 109 (3), 455–499.
Canada, G. (1996). Fist Stick Knife Gun: A Personal History of Violence in America.
Beacon Press.
45
Card, D. and A. B. Krueger (1992). School quality and black-white relative earnings:
A direct assessment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107 (1), 151–200.
Carneiro, P., J. J. Heckman, and D. V. Masterov (2005). Labor market discrimination
and racial differences in premarket factors. Journal of Law and Economics 48, 1–39.
Cook, P. J. and J. Ludwig (1997). Weighing the “burden of ‘acting white”’: Are
there race differenecs in attitudes toward education? Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management 16 (2), 256–278.
Darity, Jr., W. A. and P. L. Mason (1998). Evidence on discrimination in employment:
Codes of color, codes of gender. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12 (2), 63–
90.
Darity, Jr., W. A., P. L. Mason, and J. B. Stewart (2006). The economics of identity:
The origin and persistence of racial identity norms. Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization 60.
Diamond, J. (1999). Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. W. W.
Norton and Company.
Dirks, D. and J. C. Mueller (2007). Racism and popular culture. In H. Vera and
J. R. Feagin (Eds.), Handbook of the Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations, pp.
115–129. Springer.
Dobbie, W. and R. G. Fryer, Jr. (2009). Are high-quality schools enough to close
the achievement gap? Evidence from a bold social experiment in Harlem. Mimeo.,
Harvard University .
Donohue, III, J. J. and J. Heckman (1991). Continuous versus episodic change: The
impact of civil rights policy on the economic status of blacks. Journal of Economic
Literature 29 (4), 1603–1643.
46
Douglass, F. (1982). Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave.
Penguin.
Durlauf, S. N. and M. Fafchamps (2004). Social Capital. In S. Durlauf and P. Aghion
(Eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth. –.
Durlauf, S. N. and D. S. Nagin (2009). The deterrent effect of imprisonment. Mimeo.,
Carnegie Mellon University .
Eckstein, Z. and K. I. Wolpin (1999a). Estimating the effect of racial discrimination
on first job wage offers. The Review of Economics and Statistics 81 (3), 384–392.
Eckstein, Z. and K. I. Wolpin (1999b). Why youths drop out of high school: The
impact of preferences, opportunities, and abilities. Econometrica 67 (6), 1295–1339.
Fang, H. and G. C. Loury (2005). Toward an economic theory of dysfunctional
identity. In C. B. Barrett (Ed.), Social Economics of Poverty: On Identities,
Groups, Communities and Networks, pp. 12–55. Routledge.
Fordham, S. and J. Ogbu (1986). Black students’ school success: Coping with the
“burden of ‘acting white’ ”. The Urban Review 18 (3), 176–206.
Fryer, Jr., R. G. and M. O. Jackson (2007). A categorical model of cognition and
biased decision-making. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 8 (1), 1–42.
Fryer, Jr., R. G. and P. Torelli (2005). An empirical analysis of “acting white”. NBER
Working Paper w11334 .
Fullilove, M. T. (2001). Root shock: The consequences of African American disposs-
esion. Journal of Urban Health 78 (1), 72–80.
Gray, H. (2004). Watching Race: Television and the Struggle for Blackness. University
of Minnesota.
47
Hahn, J., P. Todd, and W. V. D. Klaauw (1999). Evaluating the effect of an an-
tidiscrimination law using a regression-discontinuity design. NBER Working Paper
7131 .
Handa, S. and B. Davis (2006). The experience of conditional cash transfers in latin
america and the caribbean. Development Policy Review, 24 (5), 513–536.
Hanushek, E. A., J. F. Kain, and S. G. Rivkin (2004). Disruption versus tiebout
improvement: The costs and benefits of switching schools. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 88 (9-10), 17211746.
Hanushek, E. A. and S. G. Rivkin (2006). School quality and the black-white achieve-
ment gap. NBER Working Paper 12651 .
Harris, A. L. and K. Robinson (2007). Schooling behaviors or prior skills? a caution-
ary tale of omitted variable bias within oppositional culture theory. Sociology of
Education 80 (2), 139–157.
hooks, b. (1999). Black Looks: Race and Representation. South End.
hooks, b. (2006). Outlaw Culture: Resisting Representations. Routledge.
Hurt, B. (2006). Hip-Hop: Beyond Beats and Rhymes. God Bless Productions.
Imai, S., H. Katayama, and K. Krishna (2004). Crime and young men: The role of
arrest, criminal experience, and heterogeneity. NBER Working Paper W12221 .
Imai, S. and K. Krishna (2004). Employment, deterrence, and crime in a dynamic
model. International Economic Review 45 (3), 845–872.
Jones, B. F. (2008). The knowledge trap: Human capital and development reconsid-
ered. NBER Working Paper 14138 .
48
Karolyn Tyson, William A. Darity, J. and D. R. Castellino (2005). It’s not “a black
thing”: Understanding the burden of acting white and other dilemmas of high
achievement. American Sociological Review 70 (4), 582–605.
Keane, M. P. and K. I. Wolpin (1997). The career decisions of young men. Journal
of Political Economy 105 (3), 473–522.
Keane, M. P. and K. I. Wolpin (2000). Eliminating race differences in school attain-
ment and labor market success. Journal of Labor Economics 18 (4), 614–652.
Keane, M. P. and K. I. Wolpin (2001). The effect of parental transfers and borrow-
ing constraints on educational attainment. International Economic Review 42 (4),
1051–1103.
Kissinger, H. (1995). Diplomacy. Simon & Schuster.
Kling, J. R., J. B. Liebman, and L. F. Katz (2005). Bullets don’t got no name:
Consequences of fear in the ghetto. In T. S. Weisner (Ed.), Discovering Successful
Pathways in Children’s Development: Mixed Methods in the Study of Childhood and
Family Life, pp. 243–281. University of Chicago Press.
Kling, J. R., J. B. Liebman, and L. F. Katz (2007). Experimental analysis of neigh-
borhood effects. Econometrica 75 (1), 83–119.
Kling, J. R., J. Ludwig, and L. F. Katz (2005). Neighborhood effects on crime for
female and male youths: Evidence from a randomized housing voucher experiment.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (1), 87–130.
LaLonde, R. (1995). The promise of public sector sponsored training programs. Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives 9 (2), 149–168.
Lee, S. (2000). Bamboozled. New Line Cinema.
49
Lochner, L. (2004). Education, work, and crime: A human capital approach. Inter-
national Economic Review 45 (3), 811–843.
Ludwig, J., J. B. Liebman, J. R. Kling, G. J. Duncan, L. F. Katz, R. C. Kessler,
and L. Sanbonmatsu (2008). What can we learn about neighborhood effects from
the Moving to Opportunity experiment? American Journal of Sociology 114 (1),
144–188.
McClaskie, S. (2009, February 5). Personal communication: Email. NLS User Ser-
vices .
Miller, C., J. Riccio, and J. Smith (2009). A preliminary look at early educational
results of the Opportunity NYC family rewards program. A research note for
funders, MDRC.
Mocan, H. N., S. C. Billups, and J. Overland (2005). A dynamic model of differential
human capital and criminal activity. Economica 72, 655–681.
NCHS (2009). Health, United States, 2008. National Center for Health Statistics.
Hyattsville, MD.
Neal, D. A. and W. R. Johnson (1996). The role of premarket factors in black-white
wage differences. Journal of Political Economy 104 (5), 869–895.
Neckerman, K. M. (2007). Schools Betrayed: Roots of Failure in Inner-City Education.
University of Chicago.
Ogbu, J. U. (Ed.) (2008). Minority Status, Oppositional Culture, and Schooling.
Routledge.
Patacchini, E. and Y. Zenou (2006). Racial identity and education. IZA Discussion
Paper 2046 .
50
Perry, I. (2004). Prophets of the Hood: Politics and Poetics in Hip Hop. Duke
University Press.
Perry, I. (2008). “Tell us how it feels to be a problem:” Hip Hop longings and poor
young black men. In E. Anderson (Ed.), Against the Wall: Poor, Young, Black,
and Male, pp. 165–178. University of Pennsylvania Press.
Pettit, B. and B. Western (2004). Mass imprisonment and the life course: Race and
class inequality in US incarceration. American Sociological Review 69, 151–169.
Rivkin, S. G., E. A. Hanushek, and J. F. Kain (2005). Teachers, schools, and academic
achievement. Econometrica 73 (2), 417–458.
Rose, T. (2008). The Hip-Hop Wars: What We Talk About When We Talk About
Hip Hop – and Why It Matters. Basic.
Sampson, R. J., P. Sharkey, and S. W. Raudenbush (2008). Durable effects of concen-
trated disadvantage on verbal ability among African-American children. Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 105 (3),
845–852.
Sanbonmatsu, L., J. R. Kling, G. J. Duncan, and J. Brooks-Gunn (2006). Neigh-
borhoods and academic achievement: Results from the Moving To Opportunity
experiment. The Journal of Human Resources 41 (4), 649–691.
Schultz, T. W. (1961). Investment in Human Capital. The American Economic
Review 51 (1), 1–17.
Sharkey, P. T. (2006). Navigating dangerous streets: The sources and consequences
of street efficacy. American Sociological Review 71 (5), 826–846.
51
Silverman, D. (2004). Street crime and street culture. International Economic Re-
view 45 (3), 761–786.
Stewart, E. A. and R. L. Simons (2009). The Code of the Street and African-American
Adolescent Violence. Washington, DC: Office of Justice Programs, US Department
of Justice.
Thornberrry, T. P. and M. D. Krohn (2002). Measurement Problems in Criminal Jus-
tice Research: Workshop Summary, Chapter Comparison of Self-Report and Offi-
cial Data for Measuring Crime, pp. 43–94. Washington, DC: National Academies
Press.
Todd, P. E. and K. I. Wolpin (2006). Assessing the impact of a school subsidy program
in mexico: Using a social experiment to validate a dynamic behavioral model of
child schooling and fertility. The American Economic Review 96 (5), 1384–1417.
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Tables
Table 1: Percent of Males Choosing Neither to Attend School Nor to Work More
Than 15 Hours per Week
Percent n
Age White Black White Black
12 0.0 0.0 2,695 1,196
13 0.4 0.6 2,691 1,192
14 1.2 1.7 2,671 1,184
15 2.3 3.7 2,623 1,170
16 3.6 7.0 2,571 1,154
17 6.6 17.3 2,506 1,119
18 9.7 24.3 2,402 1,080
19 11.8 30.1 2,364 1,038
20 13.6 31.8 2,299 1,019
21 15.5 32.8 2,157 969
22 16.1 32.1 1,680 783
23 14.7 30.0 1,170 560
24 12.3 30.2 692 328
25 17.6 27.7 302 130
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Table 2: NLSY97 Males’ Neighborhood and School Characteristics, by Race (%)
Percent Seen Someone Shot At
Age Range
Race < 12 12–18
Black 26.07∗∗ 31.40∗∗
White 7.59∗∗ 11.63∗∗
Percent Typically Hear Gunshots
Days Per Week
Race 0 1 2 3 4+
Black 61.44 14.27 8.47 5.23 10.59
White 83.00 7.63 2.82 1.92 4.62
Percent At School
Have Ever:
Race Had Something Stolen Been Threatened Been in a Fight
Black 32.32∗∗ 22.16 33.08∗∗
White 24.53∗∗ 23.64 19.66∗∗
Percent At School
Feel Safe:
Race Strongly Agree Disagree or Strongly Disagree
Black 22.39∗∗ 20.72∗∗
White 35.24∗∗ 10.53∗∗
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Table 3: NLSY97 Males’ Family and Peer Variables, by Race (%)
Parents’ Expectations
Percent Chance of Child Receiving:
HS Diploma by 20 College Degree by 30
Race Mean Median Mean Median
Black 89.72 100 64.59 70.00
White 95.29 100 66.12 75.00
Peer Group
Percent of Peers Planning on Going to College
Race ≈25% Or Less
Black 22.46∗∗
White 14.17∗∗
Resident Mother’s Highest Grade Completed
Percent of Mothers Completing:
≤11th Grade ≥4th Year College
Black 24.22∗∗ 11.52∗∗
White 15.82∗∗ 23.26∗∗
Family Structure
Percent Living with a Father Figure
Black 53.19∗∗
White 81.96∗∗
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Table 4: NLSY97 Males’ Time Use, Peer Groups, and School Effort, by Race
Time Use
Hours Per Week Typically Spent
On Homework Reading For Pleasure Watching TV
Race Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Black 4.76 4.00 3.16 0.50 25.06 22.00
White 4.79 3.75 2.53 0.50 17.77 15.00
Peer Group
Percent of Peers Cut Class
Race <10% ≈25% ≈50% ≈75% >90%
Black 24.85 25.78 22.16 15.33 11.88
White 38.60 29.68 17.87 8.25 5.61
School Effort
Percent of NLSY97 Males Who Black White
Spend ≥ 2 Hours
Per Week on Homework 69.90 72.36
n 711 1,646
Missed > 10 Days
During the 1997-1998 Year 38.93∗ 30.67∗
n 262 626
Missed > 10 Days
During the 1998-1999 Year 40.63∗ 32.95∗
n 256 601
Tardy > 10 Times
During the 1997-1998 Year 34.91∗∗ 14.94∗∗
n 106 261
Tardy > 10 Times
During the 1998-1999 Year 19.39 16.00
n 98 250
Were Suspended
During 7th Grade 33.04∗∗ 14.47∗∗
n 1,156 2,613
Were Suspended
During 10th Grade 24.14∗∗ 13.41∗∗
n 990 2,409
Were Ever Late
Without an Excuse 47.97∗∗ 36.60∗∗
n 1,180 2,675
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Table 5: Educational Attainment, Males in the NLSY97 by Race (%)
Educational Attainment at Age 12
Grade Enrolled at Age 12
g(12) Black White
3 0.17 0.11
4 1.51 0.67
5 11.37 4.42
6 35.20 32.95
7 46.99 59.07
8 4.52 2.67
9 0.25 0.07
10 0.00 0.04
n 1,196 2,695
Educational Attainment at Age 20
Percent with at Least a HS Diploma
Conditional on Grade Enrolled at Age 12
g(12) Black White
4 0.00 8.33
5 19.17 28.13
6 49.72 70.16
7 78.62 87.32
8 77.78 81.97
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Table 6: Age of Black Males in the NLSY97
On Interview Date
Age 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
12 137 – – – – – – – – 137
13 228 4 – – – – – – – 232
14 249 196 8 – – – – – – 453
15 269 220 202 1 – – – – – 692
16 229 257 210 184 4 – – – – 884
17 81 251 251 221 177 – – – – 981
18 5 184 225 241 217 191 2 – – 1,065
19 – 19 176 230 227 210 192 3 – 1,057
20 – – 17 182 213 244 200 167 5 1,028
21 – – – 30 160 218 221 190 167 986
22 – – – – 19 168 230 210 196 823
23 – – – – – 27 180 204 222 633
24 – – – – – – 17 173 210 400
25 – – – – – – – 15 156 171
Total 1,198 1,131 1,089 1,089 1,017 1,058 1,042 962 956 9,542
In October of School Year
Age 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
12 35 – – – – – – – – 35
13 223 32 – – – – – – – 255
14 238 213 33 – – – – – – 484
15 281 225 211 33 – – – – – 750
16 246 275 222 205 34 – – – – 982
17 175 231 263 223 198 32 – – – 1,122
18 – 155 216 259 210 208 33 – – 1,081
19 – – 144 220 236 214 194 30 – 1,038
20 – – – 149 203 250 204 186 30 1,022
21 – – – – 136 216 247 186 185 970
22 – – – – – 138 220 232 197 787
23 – – – – – – 144 194 231 569
24 – – – – – – – 134 196 330
25 – – – – – – – – 133 133
Total 1,198 1,131 1,089 1,089 1,017 1,058 1,042 962 972 9,558
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Table 7: Work and School Choices of Black Males (%)
Data
Age Work School Neither n
12 0.00 100 0.00 1,196
13 0.00 99.41 0.59 1,192
14 0.00 98.31 1.69 1,184
15 0.43 95.90 3.68 1,170
16 1.82 91.16 7.02 1,154
17 6.97 75.69 17.34 1,119
18 23.06 52.69 24.26 1,080
19 38.34 31.60 30.06 1,038
20 45.53 22.67 31.80 1,019
21 50.77 16.41 32.82 969
22 55.04 12.90 32.06 783
23 61.96 8.04 30.00 560
24 66.77 3.05 30.18 328
25 70.77 1.54 27.69 130
Simulations
Age Work School Neither
12 0.00 98.91 1.10
13 0.00 98.24 1.76
14 0.00 96.83 3.17
15 0.00 93.37 6.63
16 4.71 85.15 10.14
17 11.91 71.24 16.85
18 29.80 47.77 22.43
19 44.52 29.45 26.02
20 49.84 21.16 29.00
21 49.92 17.62 32.46
22 51.10 14.25 34.64
23 56.18 10.93 32.89
24 60.77 7.91 31.32
25 66.26 5.70 28.04
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Work School Neither or Prison
Age Decent Violent Non-Violent Both Decent Violent Non-Violent Both Decent Violent Non-Violent Both n
12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 48.60 7.48 26.40 17.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 428
13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 49.30 8.22 24.34 17.52 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.47 645
14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 51.08 6.37 23.44 17.29 0.68 0.11 0.57 0.46 879
15 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 50.14 8.57 22.46 14.82 1.30 0.56 0.93 0.75 1,073
16 0.89 0.27 0.27 0.27 53.24 6.21 18.63 13.58 3.19 0.98 1.15 1.33 1,127
17 3.54 0.91 1.27 1.00 46.96 5.99 14.71 8.90 7.72 2.00 3.18 3.81 1,101
18 15.35 3.63 1.58 2.51 34.79 3.72 9.40 5.02 15.26 1.77 3.07 3.91 1,075
19 27.12 4.44 3.86 2.90 24.90 2.51 2.90 1.35 19.98 3.38 3.67 2.99 1,036
20 36.04 3.96 2.67 3.17 18.42 2.08 1.78 0.40 21.49 2.87 4.06 3.07 1,010
21 41.85 4.57 2.80 1.66 14.64 0.73 0.62 0.52 22.12 4.36 3.53 2.60 963
22 45.23 5.15 3.22 1.68 11.73 0.77 0.39 0.13 25.00 2.32 2.32 2.06 776
23 52.60 5.57 1.97 1.80 6.82 0.36 0.54 0.36 25.12 1.08 1.62 2.15 557
24 59.33 5.50 1.22 0.61 2.75 0.00 0.00 0.31 26.30 2.45 0.61 0.92 327
25 61.72 8.59 0.78 0.78 1.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 24.22 2.34 0.00 0.00 128
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Work School Neither or Prison
Age Decent Violent Non-Violent Both Decent Violent Non-Violent Both Decent Violent Non-Violent Both
12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 48.24 8.44 25.03 17.19 1.09 0.01 0.00 0.00
13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.97 9.18 25.49 12.60 1.71 0.05 0.01 0.00
14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 48.97 8.21 24.75 14.90 2.93 0.14 0.06 0.04
15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 45.97 7.14 23.17 17.09 5.55 0.49 0.33 0.26
16 3.87 0.47 0.17 0.19 41.07 5.86 20.92 17.29 7.88 0.94 0.78 0.55
17 9.13 1.69 0.57 0.52 35.36 4.43 16.65 14.79 12.04 1.82 1.77 1.22
18 21.49 4.73 1.91 1.66 25.95 3.00 9.50 9.33 14.87 2.58 2.74 2.24
19 30.51 7.89 2.88 3.24 19.21 1.59 4.47 4.18 16.90 3.35 3.17 2.60
20 34.78 8.50 2.98 3.58 16.07 0.70 2.80 1.58 19.51 3.83 3.27 2.39
21 36.78 7.99 2.78 2.38 14.14 0.63 2.01 0.84 22.31 4.05 3.65 2.45
22 39.20 7.14 2.69 2.07 11.31 0.60 1.73 0.61 24.83 3.86 3.69 2.27
23 43.70 7.75 2.65 2.07 8.60 0.41 1.42 0.51 23.10 3.80 3.92 2.07
24 48.06 8.05 2.61 2.04 6.32 0.30 0.99 0.32 22.39 3.65 3.43 1.85
25 53.26 8.91 2.69 1.40 4.67 0.24 0.57 0.22 20.93 3.14 2.75 1.21
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Table 10: Transition Matrices for Standard Human Capital Choices (%, n=5,000)
Row Matrix
Choice (t)
Choice (t− 1) Work School Neither
Work:
Data 78.44 5.58 15.98
Sim. 78.40 3.86 17.70
School:
Data 8.86 82.77 8.37
Sim. 10.98 82.50 6.46
Neither or Prison:
Data 26.25 8.30 65.45
Sim. 27.20 5.53 67.27
Column Matrix
Choice (t)
Choice (t− 1) Work School Neither
Work:
Data 58.74 1.63 16.20
Sim. 66.21 2.31 23.06
School:
Data 26.48 96.55 33.90
Sim. 17.89 95.47 16.25
Neither or Prison:
Data 14.78 1.82 49.90
Sim. 15.90 2.29 60.69
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Table 11: Transition Matrices for Street Behavior (%, n=5,000)
Row Matrix
Choice (t)
Choice (t− 1) Decent Violent Non-Violent Both
Decent:
Data 85.09 4.94 7.84 2.13
Sim. 84.33 6.42 7.10 2.23
Violent Street:
Data 42.49 33.33 7.45 16.73
Sim. 40.75 33.08 11.25 14.92
Non-Violent Street:
Data 48.02 4.73 38.36 8.89
Sim. 35.55 8.38 38.90 17.17
Both Street:
Data 19.07 15.04 18.35 47.54
Sim. 20.89 16.01 22.74 40.37
Column Matrix
Choice (t)
Choice (t− 1) Decent Violent Non-Violent Both
Decent:
Data 79.74 36.81 35.47 13.78
Sim. 81.32 38.17 31.10 13.71
Violent Street:
Data 5.37 33.50 4.55 14.64
Sim. 6.43 32.16 8.06 15.00
Non-Violent Street:
Data 11.60 9.08 44.71 14.85
Sim. 8.63 12.53 42.87 26.56
Both Street:
Data 3.29 20.61 15.28 56.73
Sim. 3.64 17.15 17.96 44.74
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Violent Non-Violent
Age Gun Gang Attack sv Suspended Drugs Stolen Property Arrested snv
12 7.64 3.48 23.68 26.44 27.98 2.24 7.67 19.10 3.51 46.24
13 9.30 5.03 21.92 26.27 30.60 3.77 8.27 12.98 5.15 43.64
14 9.42 6.63 21.01 24.68 30.72 5.04 8.60 11.96 8.18 41.30
15 10.01 6.00 20.22 25.26 28.41 7.24 7.41 9.64 9.10 39.13
16 9.83 5.60 16.64 22.55 21.87 7.61 5.69 8.09 10.18 35.53
17 10.42 4.75 15.00 22.61 16.59 7.55 5.44 5.64 10.99 32.79
18 9.95 4.39 11.76 20.04 7.41 8.44 3.01 4.71 13.01 25.45
19 9.38 4.05 8.70 16.67 2.03 6.76 3.94 3.62 8.98 18.00
20 8.80 3.97 6.75 15.30 0.39 5.68 2.03 2.99 9.82 15.24
21 8.70 3.61 4.89 13.77 0.31 4.00 1.78 1.89 7.29 11.69
22 8.94 1.38 4.07 11.95 0.38 4.21 0.98 0.42 6.46 10.00
23 8.07 1.32 3.92 11.09 0.18 2.15 0.78 1.17 6.49 7.86
24 7.69 0.32 2.32 9.06 0.00 1.00 1.66 0.99 1.53 3.67
25 10.83 0.00 2.48 12.50 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.83 0.00 1.67
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Table 13: High School Dropout and Incarceration
Black Males with Highest Grade Completed ≤ 11 (%)
Age Data Simulations
16 100 100
17 96.98 96.41
18 62.69 67.51
19 42.27 48.70
20 38.74 41.17
21 37.59 39.62
22 37.19 38.51
23 36.96 37.41
24 37.46 36.51
25 37.21 35.84
Incarceration of Black Males (%)
Age ≥ 6 Months
12 1.89
13 3.02
14 3.45
15 3.77
16 3.55
17 3.23
18 3.25
19 3.15
20 2.95
21 2.53
22 2.54
23 2.35
24 2.05
25 2.10
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Table 14: Wages of Black Males
Data Predicted
Age Mean Median σ n Mean Median σ n
18 10,355 9,477 6,033 223 9,039 7,297 6,871 1,583
19 11,223 9,555 8,305 359 10,017 7,864 8,120 2,316
20 12,567 11,105 9,622 406 10,877 8,508 8,749 2,444
21 11,847 9,575 10,420 431 11,737 9,371 9,500 2,442
22 12,814 10,440 11,511 388 12,425 9,346 10,726 2,466
23 11,860 9,486 9,759 307 12,055 8,519 11,604 2,729
24 12,080 8,583 12,295 198 12,579 7,628 14,024 3,013
25 8,745 6,873 6,884 82 12,360 6,754 15,676 3,353
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Table 15: Model Estimates
Parameter Standard Error
Work
α0(1) 7.652 3.00E–3
α0(2) 6.552 3.50E–3
α0(3) 6.765 7.56E–3
α0(4) 6.930 1.60E–3
α1 0.149 6.18E–6
α2 0.354 8.47E–7
α3 –0.0698 7.21E–7
α4 –5,872 1.57E+3
ρ 252 6.50E+2
Neither Work Nor School
γ0(1) –13,788 2.06E+6
γ0(2) 1,852 2.93E+4
γ0(3) 2,852 1.21E+4
γ0(4) 913 6.79E+3
γ1 834 3.75E–4
γ2 931 1.71E+2
γ3 6,052 1.54E+2
Violent
φ0(1) –2,212 6.67E+4
φ0(2) 4,858 3.71E+2
φ0(3) 3,552 1.72E–2
φ0(4) –3,061 2.68E+2
φ1 232 3.86E–1
φ2 2,485 1.82E–1
φ3 479 1.18E+9
φ4 + ψ4 –948 1.69E+3
Type Proportions
π1|g(12)≤5 0.102 5.88E–9
π2|g(12)≤5 0.194 9.39E–7
π3|g(12)≤5 0.485 2.83E–7
π4|g(12)≤5 0.219 –
π1|g(12)≥6 0.166 1.27E–4
π2|g(12)≥6 0.119 6.19E–5
π3|g(12)≥6 0.348 4.97E–7
π4|g(12)≥6 0.367 –
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Table 16: Model Estimates (Continued)
Parameter Standard Error
School
β0(1) 39,522 6.42E+3
β0(2) 9,710 5.54E+4
β0(3) 9,624 8.63E+4
β0(4) 8,295 1.08E+5
β1 –10,533 9.86E+4
β2 –20,131 6.09E+3
β3 –27,129 1.00E+5
β4 –611 2.12
β5 –638 3.70E+2
Incarceration
λ0(1) –6.00 1.02E–8
λ0(2) –5.02 1.11E+1
λ0(3) –4.49 2.3E–3
λ0(4) –5.48 3.32E–8
λ1 0.24 1.50E–3
λ2 1.17 5.68E–7
λ3 4.65 1.20E–2
λ4 0.33 1.69E–6
Non-Violent
ψ0(1) –1,723 2.77E+1
ψ0(2) 2,552 2.39E+4
ψ0(3) 5,052 5.75E+3
ψ0(4) –2,111 8.39E+4
ψ1 230 1.23E+2
ψ2 1,512 7.64E–4
ψ3 552 1.56E+9
Pr[s(a− 1) = 1]
sv(a− 1)|τ=1 –1.99 5.16E–6
sv(a− 1)|τ=2 0.65 4.61E–4
sv(a− 1)|τ=3 –0.75 4.74E–7
sv(a− 1)|τ=4 –1.52 7.92E–8
snv(a− 1)|τ=1 –1.99 6.13E–6
snv(a− 1)|τ=2 –0.75 8.39E–7
snv(a− 1)|τ=3 0.69 8.06E–4
snv(a− 1)|τ=4 –1.49 2.49E–8
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Table 17: Model Estimates (Continued)
Parameter Standard Error
Variances
σ2w 0.646 7.58E–5
σ2e 8,517 1.65E+4
σ2h 4,582 2.96E+1
σ2v 5,016 4.10E+3
σ2nv 4,137 2.62E+3
Age 12
v12 1,974 1.41E+4
i12 2,052 2.80E–3
vi12 1,052 4.91E–4
Terminal Value Function
ζ1 5,717 9.11E+3
ζ2 17,629 1.98E+5
ζ3 606 7.21
ζ4 722 5.96E+2
Interaction Terms
θ2 –9,698 1.68E+4
θ3 –11,556 4.76E+2
θ4 –20,548 2.25E+4
θ6 –7,025 1.62E+4
θ7 –4,038 5.44E+3
θ9 –11,815 8.31E+3
θ10 –12,817 3.32E+4
θ11 –12,748 1.73E+4
θ12 –23,548 2.79E+4
Classification Error Rates
EW 0.17 5.41E–4
EC 0.77 3.83E–4
ESP 0.89 2.26E–4
ESV 0.78 9.04E–6
ESN 0.81 3.68E–10
Ln Likelihood –19,471
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Table 18: Behavior by Type
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Working at 21 17.5 43.1 38.3 84.7
Enrolled in School
At 16 99.4 82.6 83.3 82.5
At 21 82.5 6.3 9.1 5.9
Neither Working Nor Enrolled in School
At 16 0.0 14.6 14.0 7.0
At 21 0.0 50.6 52.6 9.44
No High School Diploma at 21 0.1 51.7 48.2 39.4
College Degree at 24 82.1 0.6 2.0 0.7
Violent Street Capital Stock ≥ 2
At 16 0.3 65.6 43.4 0.6
At 20 0.9 91.1 75.3 1.4
Non-Violent Street Capital Stock ≥ 2
At 16 0.9 61.8 88.5 3.1
At 20 3.9 85.1 97.6 6.5
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Table 19: Type Probabilities and Demographic Characteristics
Subsample (n) Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Sample (1,196) 16.19 13.71 35.50 34.60
Personal Security
Times/Week Typically Hear Gunshots in Nbd
Zero (434) 18.67 14.50 30.90 35.93
Once or Twice (161) 12.99 12.70 34.24 40.06
At Least Three (112) 6.92 16.62 44.50 31.96
Seen Someone Shot at Before 12 (305) 9.18 17.62 48.26 24.93
At School
Had Something Stolen (383) 16.01 13.84 39.14 31.01
Been Threatened (263) 8.99 17.01 46.18 27.81
Been in a Fight (392) 7.25 17.06 48.69 27.00
HH Structure at Age 14
Do Not Live with Father Figure (556) 13.58 14.45 39.55 32.41
Live with Father Figure (634) 18.60 13.16 31.82 36.41
Mother’s HGC ≤ 11 (247) 8.74 13.47 44.49 33.29
Mother’s HGC ≥ 12 (776) 19.77 13.56 30.76 35.90
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Table 20: Counterfactual I: No Neighborhood Effects (%, n=5,000)
Simulations from the Estimated Model
Age Work School Neither HGC ≤ 11
12 0.00 98.91 1.10 100
13 0.00 98.24 1.76 100
14 0.00 96.83 3.17 100
15 0.00 93.37 6.63 100
16 4.71 85.15 10.14 100
17 11.91 71.24 16.85 96.98
18 29.80 47.77 22.43 62.69
19 44.52 29.45 26.02 42.27
20 49.84 21.16 29.00 38.74
21 49.92 17.62 32.46 37.59
22 51.10 14.25 34.64 37.19
23 56.18 10.93 32.89 36.96
24 60.77 7.91 31.32 37.46
25 66.26 5.70 28.04 35.84
Counterfactual I: No Neighborhood Effects
Age Work School Neither HGC ≤ 11
12 0.00 98.09 1.92 100
13 0.00 97.07 2.93 100
14 0.00 95.54 4.47 100
15 0.00 92.41 7.59 100
16 5.55 85.55 8.90 100
17 13.76 74.67 11.58 96.42
18 33.81 53.04 13.15 66.49
19 53.15 34.30 12.55 45.72
20 63.21 23.86 12.93 35.99
21 67.14 19.11 13.74 33.93
22 70.65 14.91 14.44 32.37
23 77.30 10.88 11.82 31.13
24 82.62 8.05 9.34 30.17
25 88.14 5.62 6.24 29.31
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Table 21: Counterfactual II: Starting Over (%, n=5,000)
Simulations from the Estimated Model
Age Work School Neither HGC ≤ 11
12 0.00 98.91 1.10 100
13 0.00 98.24 1.76 100
14 0.00 96.83 3.17 100
15 0.00 93.37 6.63 100
16 4.71 85.15 10.14 100
17 11.91 71.24 16.85 96.98
18 29.80 47.77 22.43 62.69
19 44.52 29.45 26.02 42.27
20 49.84 21.16 29.00 38.74
21 49.92 17.62 32.46 37.59
22 51.10 14.25 34.64 37.19
23 56.18 10.93 32.89 36.96
24 60.77 7.91 31.32 37.46
25 66.26 5.70 28.04 35.84
Counterfactual II: Starting Over
Age Work School Neither HGC ≤ 11
12 0.00 98.91 1.10 100
13 0.00 98.24 1.77 100
14 0.00 96.83 3.17 100
15 0.00 93.37 6.63 100
16 4.47 85.61 9.93 100
17 7.93 76.85 15.23 96.41
18 20.53 60.23 19.25 64.03
19 35.00 43.41 21.58 41.14
20 43.72 32.78 23.50 30.50
21 49.35 25.27 25.38 28.00
22 54.31 19.09 26.60 26.75
23 59.63 14.77 25.60 25.48
24 63.68 11.85 24.47 24.52
25 69.79 8.21 22.00 23.74
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Table 22: Counterfactual III: Wage Subsidy (%, n=5,000)
Simulations from the Estimated Model
Age Work School Neither HGC ≤ 11
12 0.00 98.91 1.10 100
13 0.00 98.24 1.76 100
14 0.00 96.83 3.17 100
15 0.00 93.37 6.63 100
16 4.71 85.15 10.14 100
17 11.91 71.24 16.85 96.98
18 29.80 47.77 22.43 62.69
19 44.52 29.45 26.02 42.27
20 49.84 21.16 29.00 38.74
21 49.92 17.62 32.46 37.59
22 51.10 14.25 34.64 37.19
23 56.18 10.93 32.89 36.96
24 60.77 7.91 31.32 37.46
25 66.26 5.70 28.04 35.84
Counterfactual III: Wage Subsidy
Age Work School Neither HGC ≤ 11
12 0.00 99.06 0.94 100
13 0.00 98.47 1.53 100
14 0.00 97.11 2.90 100
15 0.00 93.26 6.75 100
16 8.53 82.74 8.74 100
17 19.56 67.26 13.18 96.50
18 40.61 43.27 16.11 68.70
19 56.12 25.95 17.94 51.63
20 61.28 19.04 19.68 44.93
21 61.43 16.15 22.42 43.73
22 61.92 13.14 24.94 42.84
23 66.37 9.92 23.71 41.83
24 70.82 7.09 22.10 41.07
25 75.04 5.60 19.91 40.48
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Table 23: Counterfactual IV: Conditional Cash Transfer (%, n=5,000)
Simulations from the Estimated Model
Age Work School Neither HGC ≤ 11
12 0.00 98.91 1.10 100
13 0.00 98.24 1.76 100
14 0.00 96.83 3.17 100
15 0.00 93.37 6.63 100
16 4.71 85.15 10.14 100
17 11.91 71.24 16.85 96.98
18 29.80 47.77 22.43 62.69
19 44.52 29.45 26.02 42.27
20 49.84 21.16 29.00 38.74
21 49.92 17.62 32.46 37.59
22 51.10 14.25 34.64 37.19
23 56.18 10.93 32.89 36.96
24 60.77 7.91 31.32 37.46
25 66.26 5.70 28.04 35.84
Counterfactual IV: Conditional Cash Transfer
Age Work School Neither HGC ≤ 11
12 0.00 99.19 0.81 100
13 0.00 98.74 1.26 100
14 0.00 97.85 2.15 100
15 0.00 95.77 4.24 100
16 3.03 90.48 6.49 100
17 8.91 79.19 11.90 96.04
18 27.98 54.14 17.89 62.90
19 44.89 32.41 22.69 40.44
20 51.44 21.85 26.71 31.21
21 51.35 17.83 30.82 29.50
22 52.27 14.30 33.43 28.22
23 57.18 10.76 32.06 27.01
24 61.48 7.80 30.72 26.01
25 66.65 5.76 27.58 25.40
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Figure 4: Black Males Choosing Neither to Work nor to Attend School, by xnv
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Figure 5: Black Males Choosing Neither to Work nor to Attend School, by xv
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Figure 7: Estimated Model: School
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Figure 8: Estimated Model: Neither Work Nor School
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Figure 9: Estimated Model: High School Graduates
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Figure 10: Estimated Model: Decent Behavior
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Figure 11: Estimated Model: Violent Street Behavior
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Figure 12: Estimated Model: Non-Violent Street Behavior
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Figure 13: Estimated Model: Both Types of Street Behavior
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Figure 14: Est. Model: Wages at 18
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Figure 15: Est. Model: Wages at 19
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Figure 16: Est. Model: Wages at 20
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Figure 17: Est. Model: Wages at 21
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Figure 18: Est. Model: Wages at 22
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Figure 19: Est. Model: Wages at 23
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Figure 20: Est. Model: Wages at 24
0
.0
00
02
.0
00
04
.0
00
06
.0
00
08
f(
x)
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
Wages ($)
Actual Predicted
25 Year−Old Black Males
Kernel Density Estimates of Accepted Wages
Figure 21: Est. Model: Wages at 25
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Figure 22: Estimated Model: Prison
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Figure 23: Counterfactual I: Work
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Figure 24: Counterfactual I: School
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Figure 25: Counterfactual I: Neither Work Nor School
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Figure 26: Counterfactual I: High School Graduates
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Figure 27: Counterfactual I: Decent Behavior
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Figure 28: Counterfactual I: Violent Street Behavior
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Figure 29: Counterfactual I: Non-Violent Street Behavior
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Figure 30: Counterfactual I: Both Types of Street Behavior
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Figure 31: Counterfactual II: Work
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Figure 32: Counterfactual II: School
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Figure 33: Counterfactual II: Neither Work Nor School
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Figure 34: Counterfactual II: High School Graduates
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Figure 35: Counterfactual II: Decent Behavior
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Figure 36: Counterfactual II: Violent Street Behavior
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Figure 37: Counterfactual II: Non-Violent Street Behavior
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Figure 38: Counterfactual II: Both Types of Street Behavior
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Figure 39: Counterfactual III and IV: Work
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Figure 40: Counterfactual III and IV: School
94
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
P
er
ce
nt
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Age
Predicted Wage Subsidy
Conditional Cash Transfer
Percent of Black Males Neither at School Nor Working
Figure 41: Counterfactual III and IV: Neither Work Nor School
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Figure 42: Counterfactual III and IV: High School Graduates
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Figure 43: Counterfactual III and IV: Decent Behavior
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Figure 44: Counterfactual III and IV: Violent Street Behavior
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Figure 45: Counterfactual III and IV: Non-Violent Street Behavior
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Figure 46: Counterfactual III and IV: Both Types of Street Behavior
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